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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  The Promise of Arbitration 
Arbitration has long served as a contractual substitute for judicial litigation.1  It 
provided a workable and effective form of adjudication in ancient societies and 
among religious groups, much as it does in contemporary times.2  Its long-standing 
appeal resides in enabling parties to choose a private adjudicatory mechanism based 
upon expertise and expedition that delivers fair, affordable, and enforceable 
outcomes.  Arbitral adjudication effectively intermediates between the need for 
functional trial procedures and the imperative of safeguarding legal rights.3  Rights 
                                                          
† Professor Carbonneau is the Orlando Distinguished Professor and Director, Arbitration 
Institute Penn State Law. 
 1 For a general account of the history of arbitration, see, e.g., FRANCES KELLOR, 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1948); IAN R. 
MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, 
INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992); DEREK ROEBUCK, EARLY ENGLISH ARBITRATION (2008); Lord 
Mustill, Arbitration: History and Background, 6 J. INT’L ARB. 43 (1989); Katherine V.W. 
Stone, Arbitration-National, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY (D. Clark ed. 
forthcoming); Imre S. Szalai, Modern Arbitration Values and the First World War, 49 AM. J. 
LEGAL HISTORY 355 (2009).  
 2 See sources cited supra note 1. 
 3 According to the late Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, “ADR devices are often superior 
to litigation ‘in terms of cost, time, and human wear and tear.’” AMF Inc., v. Brunswick 
Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing remarks of Warren E. Burger, Chief 
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cannot be vindicated if the applicable hearing mechanisms are inaccessible and 
inefficient.  The protracted puffery of lawyers is not a feasible solution for most 
parties in conflict.   
Although it casts them—to some degree—in a misleading and unflattering light, 
arbitral procedures gained sharper definition when they were adopted by trade 
groups just prior to and following the industrial revolution.4  The objective was to 
shield business operations from legal encroachments.  Legal requirements could 
hinder significantly the efficacy of commercial relationships and the profitability of 
transactions.5  Adjudicators, experienced in the trade and prone to practical solutions, 
could perform their decisional tasks in informal trial settings.  In a word, decision-
makers of a kindred spirit avoided ritualistic fanfare and rendered rulings that 
properly reflected the interests of their colleagues.  The flexible confines of 
arbitration permitted parties to be heard and a record of the matter constituted 
without subjecting the litigants and their disagreement to adversarial 
dismemberment.  In these commercial sectors, rationality and pragmatism generally 
prevailed in the resolution of disputes.6  
                                                          
Justice of the United States, at the Twin Cities Advisory Council of the American Arbitration 
Association, St. Paul, Minn., August 21, 1985).  Arbitration permits “merchants and 
companies to expend more resources on their commercial activities by supplying them with a 
frugal, fair, and final form of expert and effective adjudication.”  Thomas E. Carbonneau, 
Judicial Approbation in Building the Civilization of Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1343, 
1367 (2009) [hereinafter Judicial Approbation].  THOMAS CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 21 (3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE] 
(Proponents “seek to achieve two basic goals: First, the practical objective of lessening the 
human and economic costs associated with judicial litigation; second, the ideological and 
humanistic aim of ‘empowering’ disputants and to have them develop a psychologically 
‘healthier’ approach to conflict management.”). 
 4 “The principal support for the Act came from trade associations dealing in groceries and 
other perishables and from commercial and mercantile groups in the major trading centers.”  
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 411 n.2 (1967) (Black, J., 
dissenting).  See also 50 A.B.A. Rep. 357 (1925). 
 5 See, e.g., Katherine V.W. Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999), (citing SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 92-96 (3d ed. 2d prtg. 1966)); Philip G. Phillips, The Paradox in 
Arbitration Law: Compulsion as Applied to a Voluntary Proceeding, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1258 
(1933); JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 53-55 (1918). 
 6 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, “Arbitracide”: The Story of Anti-Arbitration Sentiment in 
the U.S. Congress, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 233 (2007) [hereinafter Arbitracide] (“An 
adjudicatory process that is efficient, effective, and accessible can hardly be described as 
incapable of protecting rights. The expense and indecision associated with protracted 
adversarial proceedings before courts do not protect citizen rights, but rather promote the 
attorneys' combat and embellish their fees.  Lawyers, of course, tendentiously assert that 
participation in their battleground is synonymous with rights protection.  The argument 
ignores the impact of litigation warfare on the litigants' lives and interests.”); Litigation Cost 
Survey of Major Companies: Presentation to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
Judicial Conference of the United States, 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation, DUKE LAW 
SCHOOL 2 (May 10-11, 2010) (statement of U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform), 
http://lfcj.digidoq.com/BLAP/Lawyers%20for%20Civil%20Justice/FRCP%20DATA%20Liti
gation%20Cost%20Survey%20of%20Major%20Companies%202010.pdf (Finding that 
“[l]itigation transaction costs [for large corporations for cases which go to trial] on average 
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In fact, efficient results—comprehensible to the parties and providing useful 
solutions—represented a more acceptable form of fairness than the legal system’s 
narrow, single-minded focus upon procedural rigor and its jesuitical construction of 
applicable law.  Legal procedures are alien to ordinary human experience.  
Moreover, judicial litigation is permeated with distrust and cynicism.  These 
attitudes blind advocates to sensible compromise, causing them to undervalue and 
reject human ingenuity, resourcefulness, and creativity in the circumstances of 
disagreement.7  Coerced settlements or protracted proceedings are the inevitable 
outcomes.8  Trade association arbitration was not merely “merchant justice,” but 
                                                          
and as a percent of revenue have risen substantially over the past nine years . . . [excluding 
judgments and settlements]. . . . The average outside litigation cost per respondent was nearly 
$115 million in 2008, up 73 percent from $66 million in 2000. This represents an average 
increase of 9 percent each year.”). 
 7 See David Gwynn Morgan, Fairness ‘Too Much of a Good Thing’, THE POST-IRELAND 
(Nov. 21 2010), available at http://www.sbpost.ie/businessoflaw/fairness-too-much-of-a-good 
-thing-52870.html (“[T]he law is dealing with institutions of government in a constitutional 
democracy and assumes one of the features distinguishing [judges] from private individuals is 
that they are non-partisan and open to persuasion, as long as all the relevant facts are put 
before them.”); Advantages and Disadvantages of the Adversarial System in Civil 
Proceedings, LRCWA 7, 41 n.21 (1998), http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/2publications/ 
reports/P92-CJS/consults/1-2civiladvers.pdf (The obsessive focus on procedural correctness in 
litigation “inhibit[s] the courts’ capacity to link other organizations that might help the users 
of courts with other aspects of their problems.  Courts are compared unfavorably with 
[arbitral] tribunals on this subject,” and need to be “more procedurally and substantially just, 
expeditious, proportionate, managed and maximizing of resources.”); John A. Ferejohn & 
Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial 
Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 974-75 (2002) (“Many commentators see these concerns for 
judicial accountability as inescapably in conflict with the goals of judicial independence: The 
only way to make judges accountable for their decisions is to control them in ways that 
intrude on their independence.  But this mischaracterizes the problem, and we think that 
framing the issue differently dissolves any apparent contradiction.  Neither judicial 
independence nor judicial accountability are ends in and of themselves.  Both are means 
toward the construction of a satisfactory process for adjudication.  As we have seen, this 
means a process that is appropriately ‘legal’ in its nature: one in which decisions are made for 
appropriately legal sorts of reasons, without regard for considerations that law considers 
extraneous or immaterial.  As we have also seen, however, it means a process that is subject to 
legitimate democratic control over differences in the range of outcomes procurable within the 
confines of legal analysis: a process in which judges cannot deviate too far from popular 
political understandings for reasons unconstrained but not excluded by law.  Not surprisingly, 
these joint and several allegiances to law and democracy―with their joint and several 
objectives of procedural rectitude, legal impartiality, and democratic 
accountability―necessitate a complex institutional design. Searching for the right system, we 
mix and match in different ways and to different degrees various arrangements―some 
protecting the independence of judges, others making them accountable―in the effort to 
construct a properly balanced judiciary.”). 
 8 Arbitracide, supra note 6, at 269 n.160 (“Access and operational effectiveness are the 
attributes of the arbitral process that make it far superior to judicial litigation.  It achieves 
functionality while also protecting rights and assuring that arbitral proceedings guarantee due 
process rights.”); THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CARBONNEAU ON ARBITRATION: COLLECTED 
ESSAYS 360, n.32 (2010) [hereinafter ON ARBITRATION] (Among specialized groups, 
arbitration stands for “adjudicatory efficiency, privacy, flexibility, and expertise”); (“[T]he 
human civilization associated with law and the legal process.”); (describing the Supreme 
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adjudication that satisfied the real needs of its users.  It gave effect to a rule of law9 
anchored in the commercial habits and personality of the community of merchants.10 
Arbitration rekindled the value of finality in adjudication.11  It gave res judicata 
its proper significance in the process of litigation.  The conclusive resolution of 
disputes was indispensable to social civilization.  A social dynamic in which 
disappointment was cultivated and failed circumstances were perpetually 
reconsidered would undermine the operation of society.  In arbitration, the litigants’ 
time, energy, and treasure—not to mention their rights—no longer needed to be 
sacrificed to a distant, insatiable, and abstract “ideal” of justice.  Parties could 
engage in an effective and workable process of adjudication.  They could explain 
their behavior, state their positions on the issues, be given a determination, and 
resume their business activities.  In arbitration, advocacy was reunited with a 
measured sense of purpose and an awareness that adversarialism could have a 
destructive impact upon the parties, their interests, and society.  The utility and 
resourcefulness of the arbitral remedy eventually led it to have a broader role in 
American society.12 
                                                          
Court’s rulings on arbitration as “motivated exclusively by a desire to fulfill its responsibility 
to the rule of law―to the provision of effective legal and juridical services in American 
society.”); and (“the rule of law is also instrumental to an individual’s rights and personal 
allegiance to society.”).  Id. at 43-44. 
 9 See ON ARBITRATION, supra note 8, at 4 (“Practicability has emerged as the dominant 
force in the definition and implementation of law”); (“The general recourse to arbitration 
reflects a growing need for more rational dispute resolution”); (The use of arbitration . . . 
“evidences confidence in human rationality, the capacity to achieve compromise, and, more 
generally, a stance for more far-reaching dispute resolution goals. . . . Arbitration allows the 
parties to assume responsibility for and exercise basic governance over their adjudicatory 
destiny.”). 
 10 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
10, 1958, art. V(1)(e), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention] 
(providing that “an award can be denied recognition or enforcement if it is not final or has 
been set aside by a court in another jurisdiction with contacts to the arbitration”).  See also 
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 794 
(5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter CASEBOOK].  ON ARBITRATION, supra note 8, at 191 (“[T]he view 
that arbitration is an autonomous and fully-functional adjudicatory process and that the 
contract of arbitration is the law between the parties . . . allows for the possibility that the 
earlier arbitral award constitutes a final and binding determination of the question, precluding 
the court from ruling . . . on the basis of res judicata.”). 
 11 ON ARBITRATION, supra note 8, at 156 (The doctrine of functus officio emphasizes the 
“importance of finality in arbitration and the need to contain the appeal of awards to 
fundamental procedural irregularities,” fostering efficiency, justice, and finality); CASEBOOK, 
supra note 10, at 701 (“The doctrine is motivated by the perception that arbitrators, lacking 
the institutional protection of judges, may be more susceptible to outside influences pressuring 
for a different outcome and also by the practical concern that the ad hoc nature of arbitral 
tribunals makes them less amenable to re-convening than a court.”). 
 12 See Judicial Approbation, supra note 3, at 1343. 
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B.  The Work of the Court 
The U.S. Supreme Court has been the chief advocate for arbitration’s integration 
into the adjudicatory mainstream.13  Judicial support has been vital to arbitration 
wherever it has taken hold.14  In the last forty years, the High Court has decided 
forty-five arbitration cases and continues to cast a watchful eye upon the evolution of 
                                                          
 13 The U.S. Supreme Court sees the Federal Arbitration Act as a vehicle for achieving the 
congressional objective of fostering the enforcement of arbitration agreements.  See generally 
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1 
(1983); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 
465 U.S. 1 (1984).  The Court federalized the law of arbitration through the federal 
preemption doctrine, immunizing arbitration from conflicting state law regulatory provisions. 
See Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 
Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Southland, 465 U.S. 1; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 
460 U.S. 1 (The Court discovered a strong “federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” in 
the Act.  Id. at 24.); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1986); Southland, 
465 U.S. 1.  The U.S. Supreme Court also emphasized the role of contractual freedom in 
arbitration, requiring courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate in 
accordance with parties’ stipulations. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 
U.S. 52 (1995); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468 (1989).  The Court also substantially increased the decisional sovereignty of the arbitrator 
to decide the arbitration agreement’s meaning, confining courts to the most basic threshold 
matters.  See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Howsam v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); PacifiCare Health Sys. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003).  
The Court advanced a wide definition of interstate commerce, extending the scope of the 
FAA’s application to almost all commercial transactions.  See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 
539 U.S. 52 (2003).  It also increased the scope of arbitrability to encompass the vast majority 
of statutory claims.  See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 614; Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20; 14 Penn Plaza 
LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). 
 14 See generally Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Ins., 450 U.S. 728 
(1981); Wright v. Universal Mar. Ser. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1981); Moses H. Cone Mem’l, 460 
U.S. 1, 24; Southland Corp., 465 U.S. 1; Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. 79; Allis-Chalmers 
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985); Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 614; AT&T Techs., Inc. v. 
Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 
482 U.S. 220 (1987); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 
AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20; Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. 52; Allied-Bruce 
Terminix, 513 U.S. 265; Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 
(1995); Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681; Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 
U.S. 193 (2000); Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 
U.S. 57 (2000); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 
532 U.S. 504 (2001); Howsam, 537 U.S. 79; Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444; Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. 
52; PacifiCare Health, 538 U.S. 401; Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 
(2006); Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 529 (2008); Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 
978 (2008); Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008);14 Penn Plaza, 
129 S. Ct. 1456; Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262 (2009); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. 
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. 1758; EEOC v. Waffle House, 
Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1740 
(2011); Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bro. of Teamsters, 561 U.S., 130 J. Ct. 2847 (2011). 
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arbitration law among lower courts.  As it built its decisional “edifice”15 on 
arbitration, the Court refashioned the content of the U.S. or Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA),16 seeking to make arbitration impervious both to serious attacks and 
perfunctory, but time-consuming adversarial challenges.17  As a result, the statute is 
now animated by a strong or emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration.18  
Moreover, the federal law overrides any state law of arbitration that conflicts with its 
basic precepts, giving the FAA (as construed by the Court and informed by the 
principles of CBA arbitration) absolute dominion over the national regulation of 
arbitration.19  Freedom of contract and party intent—otherwise stated, the agreement 
                                                          
 15 CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 229 (quoting Allied-Bruce 
Terminix, 513 U.S. 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[O]ver the past decade, the Court has 
abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal 
Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation . . .”)). 
 16 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1925) [hereinafter FAA].  Title 9, §§ 1-
14, first enacted on February 12, 1925 (43 Stat. 883), codified July 30, 1947 (61 Stat. 669), 
amended September 3, 1954 (68 Stat. 1233). Chapter Two was added on July 31, 1970 (84 
Stat. 692).  Two sections were added to Chapter One by Congress in October 1988, and 
renumbered on December 1, 1990 (Pub. L. Nos. 669 and 702); Chapter Three was added on 
August 15, 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-369); and Section 10 was amended on November 15, 1990.  
See generally CASEBOOK, supra note 10, at 57-94. 
 17 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; Mitsubishi 
Motors, 473 U.S. at 625. 
 18 The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA to contain a strong federal policy 
favoring arbitration.  See generally CASEBOOK, supra note 10 at 57-92.  See also Prima Paint, 
388 U.S. at 411 (The FAA is “a congressional directive” to federal courts on how they should 
rule on matters of arbitration regardless of the holding in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64 (1938)).  Federal courts ruling on the basis of diversity of citizenship must apply the 
provisions of the FAA on matters of arbitration.  Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 34-35; Allied-
Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. 265.  The Supreme Court applies a wide view of interstate 
commerce.  Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 56.  In applying the federal policy favoring arbitration, 
federal courts generally uphold unilateral adhesive arbitration contracts.  Shearson/Am. 
Express, 482 U.S. 220.  But see Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 314 (an agreement to arbitrate in 
the employment context does not bar a plaintiff from obtaining relief through the EEOC.  The 
majority noted, however, that permitting such accesses “will have a negligible effect on the 
federal policy favoring arbitration.”).  The statute does not incorporate the kompetenz-
kompetenz doctrine, but the U.S. Supreme Court in First Options of Chicago provided for the 
doctrine by contract; parties could agree to submit jurisdictional challenges—by contract—to 
the arbitrators.  First Options of Chicago, 514 U.S. at 946.  More recently, the Court 
emphasized the arbitrators’ power to decide threshold matters of procedural arbitrability.  See 
Howsam, 537 U.S. 79; PacifiCare Health, 538 U.S. at 406-07; Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444.  See also 
Arthur Andersen, 129 S. Ct. 529 (holding that “a litigant who was not a party to the relevant 
arbitration agreement may invoke § 3 if the relevant state contract law allows him to enforce 
the agreement).  The Court provided for wide venue in the enforcement of arbitral awards.  
Cortez Byrd Chips, 529 U.S. 193. 
 19 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24 (“Federal law in the terms of the 
Arbitration Act governs . . . in either state or federal court.”); Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16 
(“In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended 
to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements.”); Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 221 (“The preeminent concern of Congress 
in passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, and that 
concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is 
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as written—prevail unless they are themselves antagonistic to the recourse to 
arbitration.20  Arbitrations and arbitrators have considerable autonomy.  With 
contract permission or the choice of certain institutional rules,21 arbitrators can 
resolve challenges to their jurisdiction.22  Additionally, when the contract fails to 
provide for arbitrator authority to rule on jurisdiction, arbitrators can—as a matter of 
law—interpret the arbitral clause in the same sovereign manner they construe the 
underlying contract.  Recent litigation, however, may have placed restrictions on the 
arbitrators’ threshold powers.  It appears that, despite the invention of a second 
arbitrability doctrine, courts will review the contract sufficiency of a jurisdictional 
delegation if the question is properly stated to the supervising court.23 
According to the Court, because arbitration is but a means of conducting a trial— 
exclusively a matter of procedure—its application has no impact upon substantive 
                                                          
“piecemeal” litigation, at least absent a countervailing policy manifested in another federal 
statute. . . . By compelling arbitration of state-law claims, a district court successfully protects 
the contractual rights of the parties and their rights under the Arbitration Act.”); Volt Info. 
Scis., 489 U.S. at 472  (“While the FAA therefore pre-empts application of state laws which 
render arbitration agreements unenforceable, ‘[i]t does not follow, however, that the federal 
law has preclusive effect in a case where the parties have chosen in their [arbitration] 
agreement to abide by state rules.’”); Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 269 (“[T]he Act has 
the basic purpose of overcoming judicial hostility to arbitration agreements and applies in both 
federal diversity cases and state courts, where it pre-empts state statutes invalidating such 
agreements.”); Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686 (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 281: 
“What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms . 
. .  but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.  The Act makes any such state policy 
unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal ‘footing,’ 
directly contrary to the Act's language and Congress's intent.”); Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 
U.S. at 449 (“[R]egardless of whether the challenge is brought in federal or state court, a 
challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration 
clause, must go to the arbitrator.”); Preston, 552 U.S. at 350  (“[W]hen parties agree to 
arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in 
another forum, whether judicial or administrative, are superseded by the FAA.”). 
 20 Volt Info. Scis., 489 U.S. at 479 (“Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not 
coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit. 
. . . By permitting the courts to "rigorously enforce" such agreements according to their 
terms[,] . . . we give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties, without 
doing violence to the policies behind by the FAA.”); Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57 (“[T]he 
FAA's proarbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the contracting 
parties.”). 
 21 See First Options of Chicago, 514 U.S. 938; ADR Clauses, Rules, and Procedures, 
JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-clauses/ (last visited July 10, 2010); AAA's Rules and 
Procedures, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, http://www.adr.org/arb_med (last visited 
July 10, 2010) (providing rules for commercial, consumer, employment, labor, and 
government arbitrations). 
 22 See Howsam, 537 U.S. 79; Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444.  But see Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. 
1758. 
 23 See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686; Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 449 (“[R]egardless 
of whether the challenge is brought in federal or state court, a challenge to the validity of the 
contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator.”).  
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas, 
490 U.S. at 486. 
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rights.24  Also, arbitrations proffer the same procedural protections and remedies as a 
court of law.25  Such statements, at best, are suspect and perhaps fanciful.  They are 
nonetheless an integral part of the Court’s decisional doctrine on arbitration.  Both 
contract and statutory disputes can be submitted to arbitration.26  In fact, a broad 
submission includes both types of disputes as a matter of law.27  Additionally, civil 
rights claims—despite their significance to American political and constitutional 
history—can be submitted to arbitration without qualification or preconditions.  
Unless arbitrators fail to disclose possible conflicts of interest,28 the nullification of 
                                                          
 24 Shearson/Am. Express, 482 U.S. at 232 (1987) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 
U.S. at 628 (Ordinarily, “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, 
rather than a judicial, forum.”));  Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 486 (“[R]esort to the 
arbitration process does not inherently undermine any of the substantive rights afforded to 
petitioners.”).  
 25 See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 614.  See also Shearson/Am. Express, 482 U.S. 220; 
Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477; Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20.   
 26 See MedCam Inc. v. MCNC, 414 F.3d 972 (8th Cir. 2005); Orange Cty. Choppers, Inc. 
v. Goen Techn. Corp., 374 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Masco Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. 
Co., 382 F.3d 624 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 27 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1474 (holding that a “collective-bargaining agreement that 
clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate [civil rights] claims is 
enforceable as a matter of federal law . . .”). 
 28 See Revised Uniform Arbitration Act § 12(a) [hereinafter RUAA] (“Before accepting 
appointment, an individual who is requested to serve as an arbitrator, after making a 
reasonable inquiry, shall disclose to all parties to the agreement to arbitrate and arbitration 
proceeding and to any other arbitrators any known facts that a reasonable person would 
consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding, 
including: (1) a financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding; and 
(2) an existing or past relationship with any of the parties to the agreement to arbitrate or the 
arbitration proceeding, their counsel or representatives, a witness, or another arbitrators 
[sic].”).  RUAA section 12(f) provides: “If the parties to an arbitration proceeding agree to the 
procedures of an arbitration organization or any other procedures for challenges to arbitrators 
before an award is made, substantial compliance with those procedures is a condition 
precedent to a [motion] to vacate an award on that ground under Section 23(a)(2).”  RUAA § 
12(f). 
  See FAA, supra note 16, § 10.  Section 10 provides that the United States District Court, 
in and for the district wherein the award was made, may make an order vacating the award 
upon the application of any party to the arbitration “where the award was procured by 
corruption, fraud or undue means [or] where there was evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators.”  Id.  While recognizing that arbitrators are not expected to sever their ties with the 
business community, the Court concluded that it must be scrupulous in safeguarding the 
impartiality of arbitrators, because they have “completely free reign to decide the law as well 
as the facts and are not subject to appellate review.”  Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. 
Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).  To achieve this goal, the Court imposed 
“the simple requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealings that might create 
an impression of possible bias.”  See id.  Although the Court noted that there was no evidence 
of actual bias in the case before it, the arbitrator's failure to disclose his business relationship 
with the prime contractor “constituted evident partiality justifying vacation of the award.”  See 
id.  Congress intended the “evident partiality” clause of § 10(a)(2) to ensure a fair and 
impartial arbitral process.  See id.  Section 2 provides that “an arbitrator may be challenged 
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arbitral awards is, at best, a remote possibility.29  In the Court’s view, private 
arbitrations are sui generis, or “one-off” events, with little, if any, consequence 
beyond the arbitrating parties and their transaction.30  This assertion, once again, 
induces skepticism and, in fact, disbelief; its “truth,” however, resides in its 
facilitation of a supportive and deferential judicial doctrine on arbitration.  
Articulating the latter has been an imperative for the High Court.  Accordingly, 
judicial correction or emendation—as commanded by the governing statute—is 
limited to egregious, aberrant denials of procedural justice.31  The bargain for 
arbitration must be given effect even when adhesion makes the agreement legally 
questionable.32  Although the FAA contains a restriction on the arbitrability of 
                                                          
only if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubt as to his impartiality or 
independence, or if he does not possess qualifications agreed to by the parties.”  UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 12, 2, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., 
Supp. No. 17, Annex 1, at 81-93, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1302.  
The General Standards Regarding Impartiality, Independence and Disclosure provide that 
“[e]very arbitrator shall be impartial and independent of the parties at the time of accepting an 
appointment to serve and shall remain so during the entire arbitration proceedings until the 
final award has been rendered or the proceeding has otherwise finally terminated.”  Part I 
Rule (1), IBA Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, IBANET.ORG (May 22, 2004), 
http://www.ibanet.org/ENews_Archive/IBA_July_2008_ENews_ArbitrationMultipleLang.asp
x.  The AAA-ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators establishes a presumption that all 
arbitrators, including party-designated arbitrators, are neutral.  The Code of Ethics for 
Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N (2004), http://www.americanbar. 
org/content/dam/aba/migrated/dispute/commercial_ disputes.authcheckdam.pdf;  Ethics 
Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration, CALIFORNIA COURTS (adopted 
by the Judicial Council of California April 19, 2002), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ 
ethics_standards_neutral_arbitrators.pdf; DEERING’S CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, Appendix, 
Division VI (Lexis-Nexus 2003); Harry L. Arkin, Neutrality of Dispute Resolution in 
International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 15(11) WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 270 (2004); 
Markham Ball, Probity Deconstructed – How Helpful, Really, are the New International Bar 
Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration?, 15(9) WORLD 
ARB. & MED. REP. 333 (2004).  
 29 See generally Matthew David Disco, The Impression of Possible Bias: What a Neutral 
Arbitrator Must Disclose in California, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 113 (1993); Laurence Shore, 
Disclosure and Impartiality: An Arbitrator's Responsibility vis-a-vis Legal Standards, 57 
DISP. RESOL. J. 32 (2002); James Wangelin, Buttressing the Pillars of Arbitration, 19(1) INT’L 
ARB. REP. 27 (2004); Otto de Witt Wijnen, Nathalie Voser, & Neomi Rao, Background 
Information on the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, 5 BUS. 
L. INT’L 433 (2004).  See also CASEBOOK, supra note 10, at 540.   
 30 See Shearson/Am. Express, 482 U.S. 220.  
 31 ON ARBITRATION supra note 8, at 142 (The strong presumption in FAA § 10 favoring 
judicial enforcement of arbitration awards limits judicial oversight. Awards that are subject to 
vacatur must arise from an “arbitration [that was] corrupted or denatured as an adjudicatory 
proceeding [and] it amounts to a denial of justice to one of the parties.”  Such “debilitating 
elements” include: bias in the arbitrators, unrevealed relationships among parties to the 
arbitration, bribery, and arbitrator interest in the outcome.  See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. 
Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1999) (“parties agree to arbitrate and trade ‘the 
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and 
expedition of arbitration.’”). 
 32 See, e.g., Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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employment disputes,33 the near totality of workplace controversies can be heard and 
decided by arbitrators.34 
The Court’s decisional law on arbitration is steadfast (at least, in terms of 
assembling a majority of Justices for each case),35 despite the variable political 
strains in the Court’s composition, the ubiquitous turnover of its membership, and 
the succession of Chief Justices.36  Over the years, the haphazard thinking and 
periodic brevity37 of some rulings demonstrated that the Justices were not necessarily 
interested in the doctrinal content of arbitration law, but rather perceived arbitration 
primarily as a means of achieving an important practical objective.38  Despite 
vigorous discussions in a few cases, the Court has not seen arbitration as a law that 
warrants rigorous analysis.39  It is an adjudicatory procedure that allows the legal 
process to manage its resources and dockets when the other branches of government 
                                                          
 33 See FAA, supra note 16, § 4 (the so-called employment contract exclusion); Circuit 
City Stores, 532 U.S. at 112 (the employment contract exclusion is limited to transportation 
workers “‘actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce.’”). 
 34 See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 450-51 
(1957) (“. . . § 301(a) is more than jurisdictional . . . it authorizes federal courts to fashion a 
body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements and 
includes within that federal law specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances under 
collective bargaining agreements.”). 
 35 The three most recent decisions were essentially decided by a 5-to-4 margin and divided 
the Court on grounds of political ideology.  See Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (5-to-3 
with one justice abstaining from the decision); Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. 2772; AT&T 
Mobility, 563 U.S. ____, 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
 36 The last three Supreme Court Chief Justices favored arbitration.  See generally AT&T 
Mobility (Roberts, J., joining); Bazzle, 531 U.S. 79 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  See also 
Broadcast: Chief Justice Burger urges use of arbitration to settle legal disputes (NBC News 
1982), http://www.nbcuniversalarchives.com/nbcuni/clip5112516837 _s12.do. 
 37 The decisional law on arbitration is not a domain for sophisticated judicial analysis.  In 
fact, many decisions appear to contain seat-of-pants inventions that “fix” the problem that 
arose in the case.  The rulings are not persuasive statements of doctrine.  Arbitration, for the 
Court, is a device for implementing policy.  It is a lawyer’s area (because it is a trial 
mechanism), but it fails to capture the Court’s intellectual interest.  See, e.g., First Options of 
Chicago, 514 U.S. 938 (the jurisdictional delegation strengthens arbitral autonomy, but it also 
conflicts with FAA § 3); Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477 (arbitration is a “mere form of 
trial” having no impact on substantive statutory rights—a contention that hardly makes sense 
given the procedural traditions of the American legal system); Shearson/Am. Exp., 482 U.S. 
220 (The Court forgets its express qualification of the holding in Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 
416, confining it to transborder arbitration and proclaims ex cathedra the universal 
arbitrability of statutory rights). 
 38 The purpose of judicial supervision in the arbitral context seems to be to preserve the 
“litigation efficiencies” of arbitration so that litigating parties can derive the benefits of 
accessible adjudication.  See, e.g., Fine v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 765 F. Supp. 824, 827 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).  See also Remmey v. Painewebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994), 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1112 (1995).  See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 614 ; Scherk, 417 
U.S. 506, reh’g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974); Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. 265. 
 39 For a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court’s arbitration opinions, see generally 
CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 359-428. 
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have no inclination or ability to fund new courts.40  Arbitration is a workable remedy 
that resolves disagreements effectively with little, if any, public oversight.  It 
addresses all aspects of a dispute: its emergence, definition, and resolution.  Its 
applicable range is complete. 
By supporting arbitration unequivocally and shaping its regulation accordingly, 
the Court has provided American citizens with access to a functional process of 
adjudication.  Were it not for arbitration, the benefits of U.S. citizenship would be 
poorer.  In effect, arbitration is the wellspring of political and jural legitimacy in 
American law and politics.  Its mandate is to uphold the right to redress grievances 
by attenuating the intricate, nearly nonsensical complications of due process and the 
“kick boxing” mannerisms of procedural jousting.  In many respects, the failings of 
judicial justice have been the stepping stones of arbitration’s success.41 
C.  Adaptability and Growth 
Two final observations underscore arbitration’s basic character.  First, arbitration 
is a resilient and adaptative process that seeks to maintain its functionality and 
appeal.  Indeed, as for successful species, adaptability is arbitration’s quintessential 
trait.  Relatedly, arbitration is compelled by a commercial heritage of pragmatism.42  
For example, as transborder arbitral litigation became increasingly adversarial and 
complex, arbitral practice generated a form of arbitration with simplified procedures 
and proceedings, namely, fast-track arbitration.43  Rather than cede business either to 
courts or mediators, arbitration devised a means of responding effectively to market 
demands.  Expedition and economy—arbitration’s celebrated traditional virtues—
were available through the exercise of party choice.  
                                                          
 40 See id. at 21-56. 
 41 Thomas Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
233, 266 (2008) (“Individual parties gained access to a viable form of adjudication that 
provided workable remedies and basic fairness. Arbitral adjudication also had an extensive 
track record of adaptability to new circumstances . . . [a]daptability, expertise, and eventual 
finality are the principal characteristics of arbitration.”); Thomas E. Carbonneau, At the 
Crossroads of Legitimacy and Arbitral Autonomy, 16 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 213, 258 (2005) 
(“The functionality and adaptability of arbitration became attractive in all areas of civil 
litigation.”); Arbitracide, supra note 6, at 259 (“[T]he development of arbitration has 
demonstrated its creative ability to adjust and adapt to its changing mandate.”). 
 42 Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court: A Plea for Statutory 
Reform, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 231, 231 (1990), reprinted in ON ARBITRATION, supra 
note 8, at 351, 5 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 231 (1990) (“Arbitration has long provided a 
pragmatic alternative to court proceedings—to the formality, delays, financial onus, and 
generally destructive effects of full-blown litigation.”). 
 43 Fast-track arbitration, or “time limited” arbitration, are contractual provisions enhancing 
the effectiveness and speed of arbitration by incorporating a deadline which the arbitrator 
must follow in rendering the award. In fast-track cases, arbitrators are given substantial 
authority.  See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 60; Hans Smit, Fast-Track 
Arbitration, 2 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 138 (1991); Nicolas de Witt, Comment: Online 
International Arbitration: Nine Issues Crucial to Its Success, 12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 441, 464 
(2001); Mirèze Philippe, Are Specific Fast-Track Arbitration Rules Necessary?, ARBITRAL 
WOMEN 253, http://www.arbitralwomen.org/files/publication/0105202718125.PDF.  See 
generally CHRISTIAN BÜHRING-UHLE, LARS KIRCHHOFF, & GABRIELE SCHERER, ARBITRATION 
AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 86 (Kluwer Law International 2006). 
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Unlike court litigation, arbitration has never been a zero-sum game.  In maritime 
arbitration, a long-standing form of commercial arbitration, for example, joinder and 
the participation of non-signatory parties became a fixture of the process because of 
the inter-related character of maritime transactions.44  The transport of goods by sea 
generally involved large sums of money and required the distribution of risks.45  The 
transactional pattern typically involved a shipowner, the renter of the vessel, the 
buyer and seller of cargo, and a number of insurers in the background.  The interests 
of the parties were secured by primary and secondary underwriters.  An arbitration 
between any two parties affected the interests of the other participants to the 
                                                          
 44 See Maritime Arbitration Rules, Doc. No. 1, SOCIETY OF MARITIME ARBITRATORS, § 2, 
http://www.smany.org/sma/about6-1.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) (Consolidation) (“The 
parties agree to consolidate proceedings relating to contract disputes with other parties which 
involve common questions of fact or law and/or arise in substantial part from the same 
maritime transactions or series of related transactions, provided all contracts incorporate SMA 
Rules.”); Id. § 17 (Attendance at Hearings) (“Persons having a direct interest in the arbitration 
are entitled to attend hearings.”). 
 45 “The origins of maritime arbitration can be traced as far back as the voyages of ships 
owned by ancient Phoenicians carrying the cargoes of Greek traders.  Ever since, arbitration 
has played a significant role in waterborne commerce.  Although American Courts regularly 
enforced arbitration awards from the early days of the Republic, it was not until 1925 that the 
U.S. Federal Arbitration Act [9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14] (the “Act”) was enacted, establishing 
guidelines and a summary means for enforcing arbitration agreements as well as awards.  New 
York has regularly been chosen as an arbitral site in charter parties and other contracts of 
affreightment starting with the New York Produce Exchange Time Charter in 1913.  Although 
the New York Produce Exchange, founded in 1861, no longer exists, its form of charter party 
remains in wide general use throughout the world.  The charter calls for arbitration of disputes 
in New York by three commercial men (which is understood to mean “three commercial 
persons” regardless of gender).  Many disputes are also arbitrated in New York under various 
tanker and other charter parties.”  Maritime Arbitration in New York, SOCIETY OF MARITIME 
ARBITRATORS, INC., http://www.smany.org/sma/about2.html  (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).  
Maritime Transactions are defined by the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1, as “charter parties, bills of 
lading of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs 
to vessels, collisions or other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of 
controversy, would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction.”  FAA, supra note 16, § 1.  
Today, typical maritime disputes are based on specific factual controversies requiring expert 
knowledge of maritime practices and technicalities of vessels, navigation operation, and 
personnel requirements, such as: Standard contractual matters of sale, purchase, and repair of 
vessels; Seaworthiness; Negligence and officers’ conduct; Storage of cargo; Loading and 
unloading cargo; and damages.  See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 99-
102.  Generally, such disputes require technical expertise rather than legal knowledge.  
The Society of Maritime Arbitrators provides maritime parties with the following arbitration 
clause: “Should any dispute arise out of this Charter, the Matter in dispute shall be referred to 
three persons at New York, one to be appointed by each of the parties hereto, and the third by 
the two so chosen; their decision or that of any two of them shall be final, and for the purpose 
of enforcing any award, this agreement may be made a rule of the Court. This Charter shall be 
governed by the Federal Maritime Law of the United States. The proceedings shall be 
conducted in accordance with the Rules of the Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc. The 
arbitrators shall be members of the Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc.”  SMA Model 
Arbitration Clause, SOCIETY OF MARITIME ARBITRATORS, INC., http://www.smany.org/sma/ 
smamodelarbitration clause.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).  See also SOCIETY OF MARITIME 
ARBITRATORS, INC., MARITIME ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK 1-3 (3d ed. 1994). 
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transaction, making consolidation a necessity.  The use of three-member panels in 
commercial arbitrations also attested to the molding of arbitral procedures to 
emerging procedural exigencies and user needs. These tribunals provided each party 
with a relatively “sympathetic” arbitrator who could emphasize the designating 
party’s position during the arbitrators’ confidential deliberations.  Each party’s 
position would then be considered at this crucial stage of the process.  Although 
loyalty to the appointing party rarely dictated an arbitrator’s actual vote, the presence 
of a neutral arbitrator eliminated any prospect of deadlock. 
Additionally, when the merits review of awards became standard practice in 
English arbitration law, arbitrators began issuing “cryptic” awards that were purged 
of any reasoning on the law and merely summarized the facts and the parties’ 
arguments and announced the outcome of the litigation.46  Today, the use of 
“emergency arbitrators” prior to the organization of the official arbitral tribunal 
preserves evidence and assets, thereby assuring the effectiveness of eventual 
proceedings.47  Moreover, experts are often heard collegially by arbitral tribunals48 to 
avoid the superficial “tit-for-tat” of expert opinions and provide the tribunal with 
information of practical value. 
Second, arbitration continues not only to be adaptive, but, relatedly, to expand its 
jurisdictional range.  The development of employment and consumer arbitration is 
one illustration.  The use of arbitration in these transactional settings liberated the 
mechanism from the confines of specialty and integrated it into the more visible 
sectors of economic activity in society.  Despite the distrust of political partisans, 
arbitration has become a remedy for everyday disputes that involve ordinary people.  
The use of arbitration reflected the quid pro quos in the parties’ relationship.  
Expedited but fair justice suited the parties’ desire for efficiency and effective 
outcomes.  People wanted to have their say before a decision-maker who listened to 
them; then they wanted a responsive and considered result that allowed them to 
                                                          
 46 See ON ARBITRATION, supra note 8, at 82-83; Thomas Carbonneau, Rendering Arbitral 
Awards with Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common Law of International Transactions, 23 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 581-86 (1996). 
 47 On “emergency arbitrators,” see generally Guillaume Lemenez & Paul Quigley, The 
ICDR’s Emergency Arbitrator Procedure in Action, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 4 (Nov. 2008/Jan. 
2009); Bjorn Tude, Arbitration-Sweden SCC’s New Rules on Emergency Arbitrators, 
INTERNATIONALLAWOFFICE.COM (FEB. 11, 2011), www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters 
/detail.aspx?g=e9; Therese Villard & Polina Permyakova, Revised SCC Arbitration Rules 
Have Entered Into Force, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY, (Feb. 4, 2010), www.arbitration. 
practicallaw.com/0-501-3993; Jonathan Leach & Julian Berenholtz, The Expedited and 
Emergency Arbitrator Procedures under the SIAC Rules—Six Months on, How Have They 
Fared?, HOGAN LOVELLS (FEB. 2011), http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/68f010f 
5-af65-41ac-b36a-eecc77c4b805/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7b3ea0d5-04cd-4308-8 
e15-fa15ae622148/Article_on_revisions_to_SIAC_Rules.pdf; Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deninger, Briefing Singapore International Arbitration Centre Issues Revised Arbitration 
Rules, FRESH FIELDS (July 2010), http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2010/july 10/2 
8537. pdf. 
 48 See generally CAMPBELL MCLACHIAN, LAURENCE SHORE, MATTHEW WEINIGER, 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:  SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES (2008); ANDREW 
NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES (2009); TODD 
WEILER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION (2005). 
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resume their daily activities.  In truth, arbitration accomplishes these ends far better 
than judicial litigation.49   
On the international side, investment arbitration is a forceful example of 
arbitration’s virtuosity.50  Investment arbitration and the related use of the WTO 
dispute settlement system51 indicate that arbitral adjudication has made an inroad 
into curtailing the absolutism of sovereignty in transborder commercial activity.  The 
Schmittoff days,52 in which the State lacked the motivation even to notice arbitration, 
have long been eclipsed.  States are indeed interested in global investment practices 
and participate actively in World Bank,53 NAFTA,54 and BITs-driven arbitration.55  
In the final analysis, States are open to accepting the authority of arbitrators and 
arbitration in exchange for a stake in the lucrative business of global commerce.56 
Arbitration’s role in resolving investment disputes accentuates its adaptability 
and resilience.57  Early in the NAFTA arbitration process, the problem arose of the 
                                                          
 49 See generally CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3. 
 50 See generally CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF, COMMERCIAL LAW IN A CHANGING ECONOMIC 
CLIMATE (2d ed. 1981); CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF, SCHMITTHOFF’S EXPORT TRADE:  THE LAW 
AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1980).   
 51 See generally WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, LEGAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, A HANDBOOK 
ON THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (2004); PETER-TOBIAS STOLL & FRANK 
SCHORKOFF, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2006); ANDREW D. MITCHELL, WORLD TRADE 
LAW ASSOC. CONF., CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR WTO (2005); RUFUS H. YERXA & S. 
BRUCE WILSON, KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2005). 
 52 See, e.g., LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON, & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID 
ARBITRATION (2d ed. 2010); CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, LORETTA MALINTOPPI, & AUGUST 
REINISCH, THE ICSID CONVENTION:  A COMMENTARY (2d ed. 2009); ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS (2009). 
 53 See generally IVAR ALVIK, CONTRACTING WITH SOVEREIGNTY:  STATE CONTRACTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2010); David Schneiderman, Investing in Democracy? 
Political Process and International Investment Law, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 909 (2010); Mark C. 
Weidemaier, Contracting for State Intervention: The Origins of Sovereign Debt Arbitration, 
73 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 335 (2010); Jan Paulsson, The Power of States to Make Meaningful 
Promises to Foreigners, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLE. 341 (2010). 
 54 See, e.g., CHARLES H. BROWER II, JACK J. COE, JR., & WILLIAM S. DODGE, NAFTA 
CHAPTER ELEVEN REPORTS (2006); KINNEAR, BJORKLAND, & HANNAFORD, INVESTMENT 
DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA:  AN ANNOTATED GUIDE TO NAFTA CHAPTER II (2006); TODD 
WEILER, NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION:  PAST ISSUES, CURRENT PRACTICE, 
FUTURE PROSPECTS (2004). 
 55 See, e.g., UN CONF. ON TRADE & COMMERCE, BITS IN THE MID-1990S (1998); UN CONF. 
ON TRADE & COMMERCE, BITS 1995-2006 (2007);  UN CONF. ON TRADE & COMMERCE, 
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES ARISING FROM INVESTMENT TREATIES (2005). 
  56 See generally CHRISTOPHER DUGAN, NOAH D. RUBINS, DON WALLACE, & BORZU 
SABAHI, INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION (2008). 
  57 On the requirements for arbitrators and tribunals and their qualifications in the 
investment context, see, e.g., The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, 
AMERICAN BAR ASS’N (2004); IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration, IBANET.ORG, http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_ 
free_materials.aspx#ethics (last visited Oct. 2, 2011); Code of Conduct for Dispute Settlement 
Procedures under Chapters 19 & 20 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, WORLD 
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impact of the arbitrators’ prior experience on tribunal determinations.58  Some 
arbitrators were commercial people, while others had a greater affinity for 
diplomatic considerations.  Arbitral administrators eventually developed rules by 
which to achieve greater balance in the selected panels, so that the State was not at 
the mercy of the disposition of commercial litigators.59  Moreover, ICSID arbitrators 
recognized the value of amicus curiae briefs in arbitrations involving natural 
resources in Latin American countries.60  Both developments reflected arbitration’s 
ability to adjust its practices and procedures to new political elements.  Allowing 
commercial arbitrators to ignore the State’s public dimension or prohibit public 
interest groups from participating in proceedings would have depreciated 
arbitration’s appeal and suitability as a mechanism of dispute resolution.61   
                                                          
TRADE LAW, www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta/19-20code.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2011); Rules of 
Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, WTO.ORG (Dec. 11, 1996), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/rc_e.htm.  
See generally Charles B. Rosenberg, Challenging Arbitrators in Investment Treaty 
Arbitrations, 27 J. INT’L ARB. 505 (2010); Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: 
Exploring Decision Patters of Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47 (2010). 
 58 See generally WEILER, supra note 48.  The controversy was ignited by an editorial in the 
NY Times in 2004, entitled “The Secret Trade Courts.”  The accusations were that 
commercial litigators assembled as arbitral tribunals and resolved matters in such a fashion so 
as to promote corporate interests—not the would-be public interests supported by the State.  
The proceedings were private and confidential—closed to public attendance.  The awards 
were also inaccessible.  Once the proceedings were opened to the public, the journalists lost 
any interest in observing the process when they became aware of the complexity of the 
matters under adjudication.  The Secret Trade Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, at A1. 
 59 See generally DUGAN, supra note 56.  See also Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. 
Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22 (Mar. 31, 2006), available at http://icsid.world 
bank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1581_
En&caseId=C67. 
 60 See generally Andre de Lotbinière McDougall & Ank Santens, ICSID Tribunals Apply 
New Rules on Amicus Curiae, 22 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 69 (Feb. 2007); Gary Born, 
Steven P. Finizio, David W. Ogden, et al., Investment Treaty Arbitration:  ICSID Amends 
Investor-State Arbitration Rules (2006), available at www.wilmerhale.com/publications/ 
whPubsDetail.aspx?publication; ICSID Tribunal Affirms its Power to Admit Amicus Curiae 
Participation, available at  www.ciel.org/Tae/ICSID_AmicusCuriae_lJun05.html;  ICSID 
Tribunal accepts civil society organizations as amici curiae, available at www.ciel.org/Tae/IC 
SID_AmicusCuriae _24Feb07.html. 
 61 See, e.g., Luke Eric Peterson, Argentine Crisis Arbitration Awards Pile Up, but 
Investors Still Wait for a Payout, LAW.COM, (June 25, 2009), www.law.com/jsp/law/interna 
tional/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202431736731&slreturn:/&hbxlogin=/ (“Argentine financial 
crisis claims have been a major driver of investment treaty arbitration in recent years.  During 
the 1990s, companies like BP plc, Suez, TOTAL SA and Enron Corp. flocked to Argentina as 
the government embarked on a major privatization spree.  Then, in 2002, the Argentine 
government took a series of emergency measures to avert an economic free fall, including 
unyoking the peso from the U.S. dollar.  When Buenos Aires refused to let foreign-owned 
utilities hike the price of basic services like water, gas and electricity to compensate for the 
peso’s sharp drop, many foreign owners cried foul.  Starting in 2002, investors began to file a 
slew of arbitration claims, alleging breach of investment protection treaties.  In recent years, 
Argentina has accounted for a quarter of ICSID’s case load.  Several large law firms . . . have 
handled more than a half-dozen Argentine claims apiece—often billing $5 - $10 million a 
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It is undeniable that the operation of investment arbitration remains dependent 
upon State fealty—or, at least, acquiescence—to treaty obligations and, further, the 
national government’s willingness to enforce awards through local courts.62  In the 
end, the State must willingly surrender its authority to the transborder process.63  
Even China’s integration into the global economy, however, required the Communist 
                                                          
case, according to cost filings—and seeking hundreds of millions of dollars on behalf of 
clients.  Collectively, our 2009 Arbitration Scorecard counted more than 40 cases against 
Argentina, while arbitrations involving Argentina have produced some of the largest arbitral 
awards in recent years, including the $133.2 million CMS award and a $185 million award in 
favor of U.K. energy company BG Group plc.  
“To date, more than a half-dozen arbitration rulings have been handed down by tribunals in 
Argentine crisis cases.  Arbitrators have tended to agree that the emergency measures taken by 
Argentina were in breach of treaty obligations, because they overturned prior contractual and 
legal commitments made to investors.  But to the dismay of many observers, arbitrators have 
diverged sharply on the central question as to whether Argentina’s emergency measures—and 
the resulting treaty breaches—can be excused by the economic calamity which befell the 
country.   
“In the first ICSID ruling on this issue, in the CMS case, arbitrators flatly rejected Argentina’s 
arguments that it acted out of “necessity” in response to the crisis.  The following year, a 
separate ICSID tribunal took a contrary view:  Argentina’s emergency measures may have 
harmed the U.S. gas company LG&E Energy Corp., but they were excused on the grounds of 
necessity, at least during the peak months of the financial crisis.  In a black eye for ICSID, 
separate arbitration panels hearing broadly similar claims under the same U.S.-Argentina 
bilateral investment treaty had reached sharply divergent conclusions.   
“Arbitration specialists try to put a positive spin on these developments, stressing that some 
inconsistency is “unavoidable” given that there is no formal doctrine of precedent in 
arbitration.  However . . . lack of predictability in the ICSID system is making it increasingly 
difficult to advise clients on their international treaty rights.   
“Meanwhile, lawyers for the Argentine government complain that “contradictory” rulings give 
conflicting signals to governments trying to regulate their economics while complying with 
international law.  Argentina’s attorney general Osvaldo Guglelmino says that the ICSID 
system of one-off arbitration is “ill-conceived” when it comes to handling a tidal wave of 
similar claims arising out of systemic crises.”). 
 62 See generally id.  See also Guido Barbarosch & Pablo F. Richards, The Arbitration 
Review of the Americas 2011 Section 3:  Country Chapters, 
GLOBALARBITRATIONREVIEW.COM, www.globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/32/sections/ 
115chapterscountry (last visited Oct. 5, 2011); Eric David Kasenetz, Desperate Times Call for 
Desperate Measures:  The Aftermath of Argentina’s State of Necessity and the Current Fight 
in the ICSID, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 709 (2010); Hulya Dagdeviren, Political Economy 
of Contractual Disputes in Private Water and Sanitation:  Lessons from Argentina, 82 
ANNALS PUB. & COOPERATIVE ECON. 25 (2011); Ignacio A. Vincentelli, The Uncertain future 
of ICSID in Latin America, 16 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 409 (2010). 
 63 Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 398 (2009) (Believing the term “mandatory arbitration” is 
a misnomer.  When disagreements involve parties of disparate levels of sophistication and 
arise from adhesive contracts, arbitration is ‘mandatory’ only in the sense that it is imposed by 
the stronger party as a precondition to transacting with the weaker party.  It is, therefore, both 
more accurate and user-friendly to name this form of arbitration ‘adhesionary’ or ‘disparate-
party’ arbitration.”). 
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Party to acknowledge that international business could not take place without a 
functional rule of law supplied by an independent, recognized, and effective system 
of adjudication.  Despite difficulties and imperfections, CIETAC Arbitration makes 
business relationships and transactions with China viable.64 
Its ability to adapt and expand its range of application speak well of arbitration’s 
commercial legacy and its adjudicatory future.  Judicial litigation is analogous to a 
black hole that devours social resources, while arbitral adjudication performs the 
function of a white hole that returns energy and matter to society so it can continue 
to exist and develop.  The contemporary ascendancy of the arbitral remedy 
demonstrates that adjudicatory systems can operate effectively without (or despite) 
the exercise of State regulatory power.  Even in its extreme form, court deference to 
arbitration has not impoverished the legal system.  The law of arbitration is 
increasingly sophisticated; it has generated an abundance of legal rules and 
standards.  A corpus of provisions has emerged that provide for the process’ 
universal operation and enable it and the societies in which it functions to flourish.  
Astute social systems understand the need for intelligent regulation.  Externally-
devised constraints, imposed for reasons other than systemic integrity and cohesion, 
are not only artificial and inapposite, but they also undermine the targeted process’ 
viability.  Unless instances of radical and irremediable injustice emerge, an ethic of 
self-policing, the expansion of arbitrator power, and State quiescence remain the 
proper modus vivendi for the legal regulation of arbitration. 
II.  EMERGING ISSUES 
A.  Adhesive Arbitration and Unconscionability 
As the reach of arbitration expands to more sectors and activities, the reformation 
of adjudication that it portends has encountered stronger headwinds and greater 
opposition.  Three critical issues have arisen.  The first of these captured the interest 
of the legislative branch of the federal government and some state legislatures.  It 
relates to the potential fundamental unfairness and alleged abuse associated with the 
use of arbitration in imbalanced transactions in which the economically stronger 
party obligates the weaker one to engage in arbitration—a practice that amounts to 
coerced participation in the arbitral process.65  Commercial enterprises and 
                                                          
 64 On CIETAC Arbitration, see generally YU Jianlong, CIETAC Arbitration in a Nutshell, 
in BUSINESS DISPUTES IN CHINA CH. 8 (2d ed. 2009); JINGZHOU TAO, ARBITRATION LAW AND 
PRACTICE IN CHINA (2008); JOHN MO, ARBITRATION LAW IN CHINA (2001); I. NEIL KAPLAN, 
PETER MALANCZUK, DANIEL R. FUNG, et al., ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2001).   See also M. 
MOSER, PRACTICAL COMMENTARY ON THE CIETAC RULES OF ARBITRATION (2011). 
 65 See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool: Debunking the Supreme 
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637 (1996) [hereinafter 
Sternlight, Panacea]; Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute 
Resolution or Coercive Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131 (1996); 
David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer 
Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33 (1997); Jean R. 
Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to 
a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, (2001) [hereinafter Sternlight, Mandatory]; 
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The 
Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U.L. REV. 1017, 1042 (1996); Heidi M. 
Hellekson, Taking the “Alternative” out of the Dispute Resolution of Title VII Claims: the 
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employers often impose arbitration upon consumers and employees on an all-or-
nothing basis.  The subordinate party’s ability to buy and sell goods and services and 
to be employed depend upon its willingness to acquiesce to coerced arbitration.66  
Economic isolation is rarely, if ever, desirable or sought-after.  The motivation for 
arbitration is, therefore, paternalistic or worse in these circumstances.  It is, by any 
measure, an “involuntary” choice—a type of “super” term and condition. 
The economically superior party, however, not only makes the arbitration of 
disputes the passport to economic activity in society, but also dictates the manner of 
recourse to arbitration.  The superior party’s extensive control over the “bargain” for 
arbitration increases the prospect of overreaching and abuse.  Critics emphasize that 
adhesive arbitration agreements violate basic fairness and the traditional canons of 
contract formation.67  In addition, stronger parties can use the reference to arbitration 
                                                          
Implications of a Mandatory Enforcement Scheme of Arbitration Agreements Arising out of 
Employment Contracts, 70 N. DAK. L. REV. 435 (1994). 
 66 See Schwartz, supra note 65, at 39 (Arguing that “the current regime of compelled 
arbitration rests on three faulty analytical positions: the failure to distinguish submission 
agreements from pre-dispute agreements (the false analogy with settlements); the presumption 
that compelled arbitration is substantively outcome-neutral (the false analogy with forum 
selection); and the insistence on reviewing consent-based challenges to compelled arbitration 
on a case-by-case basis, rather than generically.”).  Additionally, “displacing adjudication 
through pre-dispute arbitration clauses systematically reduces the legal liability of corporate 
defendants. This is particularly troubling where regulatory statutes are involved. The 
enforcement of adhesive arbitration clauses allows firms to lessen the regulatory impact of 
statutory claims—in short, to deregulate themselves.”  Id. at 37.  EEOC Policy Statement on 
Mandatory Arbitration, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 133, at E4 (July 11, 1997) (The EEOC 
complains that mandatory arbitration “affords no opportunity to build a jurisprudence through 
precedent” and the availability of judicial review is necessary to protect plaintiffs’ rights; that 
costs may be prohibitive for employees as compared to employers; statutory rights may be 
limited, thus reducing the amount of damages; the public plays no role in selecting the 
arbitrators, while the private nature of arbitration limits the amount of public accountability; 
and perceived procedural and structural biases against plaintiffs in arbitration as opposed to 
litigation, especially in employment discrimination cases; Stone, supra note 65, at 1042 
(Certain arbitration policies: (1) prevent government agencies like OSHA from enforcing their 
laws; (2) reduce the statute of limitations; (3) alter the burden of proof; and (4) allow for 
untrained arbitrators.).  But see Sternlight, Panacea supra note 65, at 674-675 (“Four major 
policy arguments can be articulated in defense of a preference for binding arbitration.  First, 
some might propound a genuine or free will freedom of contract argument, asserting that 
where all parties have knowingly agreed to arbitrate the court should enforce that agreement.  
Second, some contend that even if all parties have not knowingly agreed to binding 
arbitration, they will nonetheless all benefit from the process because arbitration will save all 
parties time and money.  Third, some argue that even though sellers might want to use the 
arbitration process to gain an advantage over consumers, the operation of the market will 
prevent them from doing so, and that arbitration will again benefit all.  Fourth, some might 
contend that even if a few parties are harmed by binding arbitration, the gains for society as a 
whole outweigh any such individual losses.”). 
 67 See, e.g., Sternlight, Mandatory, supra note 65, at 669-70 (arguing that Gilmer’s 
validation of binding and mandatory arbitration in the areas of employment and labor 
disputes, denies employees’ Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The violation applied to 
consumers and any other unsophisticated party involved in adhesionary contracting.).  “The 
Seventh Amendment jury trial right supercedes any policy emanating from a federal statute.”  
Id. at 717.  Hellekson, supra note 65, at 457 (“To be a true ‘alternative’ for both employees 
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to exclude legal remedies and thereby reduce their exposure to liability.68  Further, 
they can declare themselves exempt in some, many, or all circumstances from the 
obligation to arbitrate.69  Arbitration, then, becomes a means by which the 
advantaged party abridges the weaker party’s rights and enhances its own position.70  
As long as arbitration continues to benefit from judicial protection, the imposing 
parties can escape accountability and restrictions on their conduct. 
Depriving weaker parties of their rights through contract engendered demands 
for corrective legislation.  Proposed laws categorically banned the use of arbitral 
clauses in adhesive transactions.71  The blanket condemnation amounted to a lethal 
approach; it could stigmatize and create bias against arbitration.  No matter how 
illogical or inaccurate, such positions—once established—are difficult to contain or 
alter.  Their imprint can be long-lasting, perhaps indelible.  Declaring arbitration 
agreements absolutely unlawful, even in a single set of circumstances initially, is 
drastic.72  It invites a return to the days of the legal system’s hostility to arbitration 
and casts doubt upon, and an illicit aura around, all arbitral contracts, imperils 
arbitration’s broad social use, and could deprive American citizens of arbitration’s 
substantial procedural benefits.  Seeking to criminalize adhesive arbitration73 
reflected the proverbial circumstances of “throwing the baby out with the bath 
water.”  Regulation should heed the wisdom of moderation.  Full-out banishment 
should be replaced by the goal of adding a new section to the FAA designed to 
                                                          
and employers, arbitration must be voluntarily entered into after the dispute has materialized. 
This voluntary, dispute-oriented arbitration was what Congress endorsed when enacting the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which encouraged courts to authorize parties to engage in ADR 
techniques ‘where appropriate.’”).  But see Arbitracide, supra note 6, at 252 n.118 (“Mere 
access to the remedy makes it a substantial improvement over the judicial process.”). 
 68 These provisions are known as “carve outs.”  They allow the drafting party to limit its 
exposure to arbitration by exempting some disputes from the agreement’s range or coverage.  
Such hold-back provisions render the clause suspect and must be justified by “business 
necessity.”  Donald Lee Rome & David M. S. Shaiken, Arbitration Carve-Out Clauses in 
Commercial and Consumer Secured Loan Transactions, 61 DISP. RESOL. J. 42 (Aug.-Oct. 
2006).  Court enforcement of non-compete clauses is a standard example of such provisions.  
See generally Aames Funding Corp. Sharpe, No. Civ.A.04-4337, 2004 WL 2418284 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 28, 2004). 
 69 There are examples of abuse in this area, but it should be emphasized that the promise 
of judicial justice often remains an abstraction.  Arbitration provides a functional remedy.  See 
Arbitracide, supra note 6, at 247-49. 
 70 See Fairness in Arbitration Act discussed in Arbitracide, supra note 6, at 252 (“The 
potential superiority of arbitration becomes manifest when the obligor pays the costs of 
arbitration, is equally subject to the duty to submit disputes to arbitration, and includes all the 
forms of relief available in court, including class action litigation, attorney’s fees, and punitive 
damages.”).  See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000); 
Mercuro v. Sup. Ct., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (Cal. App. 2002); Flores v. Transamerica Home 
First Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 71 See generally Arbitracide, supra note 6. 
 72 See id. at 275. 
 73 Id. at 262-63. 
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regulate—sensibly and reasonably—adhesive arbitration.74  Once righted, even a 
wobbly form of arbitration outdistances court litigation on the terrain of adjudicatory 
worth and effectiveness. 
Despite their thorough knowledge of the decisional law, the critics of adhesive 
arbitration have neglected to take into account the content of actual rulings.75  Courts 
have eradicated much (possibly all) of the unfairness of adhesive arbitration by 
requiring mutuality in the obligation to arbitrate, the allocation of arbitral costs 
primarily to the stronger, imposing party, and mandating that arbitration proffer 
relief closely equivalent to that supplied through judicial procedures.  In this vein, 
arbitral institutions have adjusted their arbitration rules to make aggregative 
proceedings available.76  Advocacy on the basis of ideological fervor is akin to 
acting on anger or rage.  It is gratifying momentarily, but, in the end, it is an 
irrational foundation for conduct that leads to outcomes that are costly to repair.  
Intemperate behavior rarely benefits the greater good.  Anger and ideology generally 
misconceive reality and distort the significance of the implicated interests and the 
positions associated with them.  Irrational thinking and behavior should be avoided 
in all circumstances. 
B.  Litigation About Arbitration 
The other emergent issues in arbitration law do not implicate the convictions of 
political ideology.   They raise more genuine issues of legal analysis.  In point of 
fact, the second of the three issues was identified by the U.S. Supreme Court itself.  
In a number of landmark opinions,77 the Court maintained that the profusion of 
judicial litigation about arbitration was antithetical to the purpose and effectiveness 
of arbitral adjudication.78  The raison d’être of arbitration is precisely to avoid 
judicial recourse.79  Accordingly, court actions that challenge the reference to, or 
results of, arbitration are counterproductive.  This consequence explains, at least in 
part, the unequivocal character of the Court’s rulings on arbitration.  Creating 
exceptions to the practice of favoring arbitration not only generates more litigation, 
but also leads to the possibility that these exceptions will engulf the original rule and 
eventually absorb it. 
Even pro forma opposition to arbitration can be harmful.  Empty challenges, too, 
could help convert the FAA into a latter-day Administrative Procedure Act (APA).80  
                                                          
 74 Id. at 275. 
 75 See works cited supra  note 65 (beginning with Sternlight, Mandatory). 
 76 See Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, http://adr.org/sp.asp?id 
=22440 (last visited Sept. 18, 2011) (AAA class procedures). 
 77 First Options of Chicago, 514 U.S. 938; Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444.   
 78 Id. 
 79 See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 387-88.  See also CASEBOOK, 
supra note 10, at 263 n.6. 
 80 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500.  See SENATOR PAT MCCARRAN, 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT:  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 79TH CONG., 1944-46, 298 (Pat 
McCarran ed., 1997) (According to Sen. McCarran, the APA was “a bill of rights for the 
hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are controlled or regulated” by federal 
government agencies.). 
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The APA was one of the first experiments in U.S. law with ADR; in the wake of 
WWII, it was intended to simplify litigation brought against proliferating 
government agencies through the use of judges specialized in administrative law, 
flexible trial models, and a body of accommodative legal principles.81  
Administrative law litigation, however, became a highly complex, expensive, and 
protracted form of court litigation.82  The Court, therefore, is right to warn of the 
danger of pushing arbitration toward the re-invention of the wheel mold that 
inevitably returns to the status quo ante.83  American society needs to have a genuine 
opportunity to avoid the crushing burden of judicial litigation and its crippling 
impact on socio-economic processes.84 
C.  Power Roles 
The final issue, also linked to standard legal analysis, relates to the distribution of 
power within the arbitral process.  To some degree, the principal parties in an 
arbitration—the arbitrating parties through their agreement, the designated 
arbitrators, and the institutional administrators—vie for controlling authority in the 
conduct of hearings and reaching a determination.85  The State—through the vehicle 
of legislation, the courts, or both—is also a major participant in the power 
configuration within the arbitral process.  Acting in the name of the public interest, 
the State―by exercising its regulatory capacity―can facilitate arbitral operations by 
giving them autonomy or discourage them by imposing restrictions upon the 
accessibility and finality of arbitration.86 The objective of government oversight 
should be to prevent fraud and overreaching, rather than fostering ill-conceived 
social policies that hamper initiative and creativity.87   The targeted entity or activity 
                                                          
 81 See D. HALL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY (4th ed. 2009); 
George Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New 
Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996).  See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s 
Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947). 
 82 This concern points to the need to make “decisions with teeth” if any real change is to 
be effectuated.  The process of judicial litigation provides an adjudicatory framework that is 
too cumbersome and expensive to maintain in the sector of civil litigation.  If arbitration 
becomes excessively judicialized, it will cease to be an alternative.  Adjudication is necessary 
to social civilization, but it cannot exceed social resources. 
 83 Responsive alternatives are a new element in the social contract.  Adjudication must be 
fair and effective.  Arbitration is a proper solution even in adhesive circumstances.   
 84 See generally, Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 773 (2002). 
 85 The entire modern law of arbitration aims precisely to foster legislation that favors 
arbitration and its autonomous operation, beginning with the enactment of the FAA in 1925 
and proceeding through the New York Convention, the UNCITRAL Model law, and various 
national laws on arbitration (in France, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and other 
jurisdictions).  The tenor of the law determines the fate of arbitration and the availability of 
functional civil justice in society.  See generally CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra 
note 3. 
 86 See FAA, supra note 16, § 2 (arbitration agreements are “valid, enforceable, and 
irrevocable”). 
 87 See generally Urban Informal Sector Investment Climate Analysis in Kenya, Note 
Number 35, THE WORLD BANK GROUP (Aug. 2006), http://siteresources.world 
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must have sufficient latitude to flourish and thrive.  The provision of basic 
safeguards and the containment of “animal spirits” are important goals,88 but 
freedom and self-definition are vital to the development of people and social 
institutions alike. 
Most arbitral statutes give the agreement to arbitrate conclusive effect.  If the 
contracting parties have provided for a particular requirement or procedure, their 
intent, as long as it is at least remotely lawful, prevails.  The settled view recognizes 
that the contracting parties have the legal right to choose to arbitrate and, further, 
provide for the specific character of their arbitration.89 Freedom of contract and party 
autonomy are generally dispositive.  In some regulatory frameworks on arbitration, 
the failure to implement the agreement as written can result in the nullification or 
non-enforcement of an award.90  When the contract is silent on a given issue, 
arbitrators possess the authority to fill the gap.91   The parties agreed to arbitrate and 
they are entitled to the benefit of their bargain―namely, arbitrator resolution of 
contested or unprovided-for matters.92 
                                                          
bank.org/INTAFRSUMAFTPS/Resources/aftpsnote35E0610-17.pdf  (“. . . the application of 
measured regulation that beneﬁts the public good.”). 
 88 See JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 
161-162 (1936); GEORGE A. AKERLOT & ROBERT J. SCHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS:  HOW HUMAN 
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009). 
 89 See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., 489 U.S. at 479 (“Arbitration under the Act is a matter of 
consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as 
they see fit.  Just as they may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so too may 
they specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.”). 
 90 See the grounds of the non-enforcement of awards under the New York Convention, 
supra note 10, art. V(1)(d) (“That the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitration 
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties. . . .”). 
 91 The rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), in the final analysis, grant 
tribunals the authority to choose the rules governing the proceedings.  Rules of Arbitration, 
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (May 1, 2010), http://www.iccwbo.org/uploaded 
Files/Court/Arbitration/other/rules_arb_english.pdf. Article 15(1) states that “The proceedings 
before the Arbitral Tribunal shall be governed by these Rules and, where these Rules are 
silent, by any rules which the parties or, failing them, the Arbitral Tribunal may settle on, 
whether or not reference is thereby made to the rules of procedure of a national law to be 
applied to the arbitration.”  Id. art. 15(1).  The language of the arbitration is governed by 
Article 16, which states that “In the absence of an agreement by the parties, the Arbitral 
Tribunal shall determine the language or languages of the arbitration, due regard being given 
to all relevant circumstances, including the language of the contract.”  Id. art. 16.  The 
applicable rules of law are governed according to Article 17(1), which states that “The parties 
shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied by the Arbitral Tribunal to the merits 
of the dispute.  In the absence of any such agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the 
rules of law which it determines to be appropriate.”  Id. art. 17(1).   
 92 See generally Chicago Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. K&i Construction, 
Inc., 270 F.3d 1060, 1067 (7th Cir. 2001) (“courts . . . would sometimes be required to deny 
employers the benefit to arbitrate by requiring arbitration but permitting unions to continue 
striking.”). 
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Institutional administrators generally respect the procedural and decisional 
powers of the arbitrators.93  They see their function as, and are compensated, to 
organize the arbitration and address non-adjudicatory administrative problems.94  
The arbitral tribunal conducts the hearings and decides the merits.95  Arbitral 
institutions have the discretion to refuse to administer arbitrations governed by 
flawed contract provisions (e.g., that require the administrator to apply the 
arbitration rules of another arbitral institution);96 they can demand that all arbitrators 
or arbitrations fulfill certain requirements (e.g., for arbitrators, relating to 
impartiality, nationality, experience, and professional qualifications; for arbitrations, 
relating to time limits, basic hearing protocols, rules for discovery or the use of 
experts, and the like).97  It is unusual for the administrator to refuse to seat a 
designated arbitrator or to challenge arbitrators.  A highly controlling approach could 
undermine the institution’s competitive standing in the service sector.  Generally, 
institutional administration takes place pursuant to broad-gauged rules, a deferential 
attitude toward the parties and the arbitrators, and a view that the purpose of 
administration is to make arbitrations workable and effective.98  Although conflicts 
can arise, there is a type of collaborative consensus that characterizes the relationship 
between the arbitrating parties, the arbitrators, and the arbitral administrator 
throughout an arbitration. 
Power relationships and investitures, however, shift throughout the arbitral 
process.  The crown of supreme sovereignty is worn by different participants at 
different stages of the adjudication.  The exercise of authority is, in effect, a double-
edged sword.  Although it empowers, it also contains the seeds of its own extinction.  
The freedom to choose is curtailed and eventually eliminated by its very exercise.  
The nearly unfettered privilege of contract choice, for example, is ensnared once it is 
invoked, enforced, and made binding.  At the very outset of the transaction—before 
any disagreement emerges—the parties decide all matters,99 subject to the restraints 
of public policy and their ability to agree (whether to arbitrate, how to select the 
arbitrators, the choice of ad hoc or institutional arbitration, the designation of an 
arbitral institution [if relevant] and of governing laws, and, possibly, the details of 
the arbitral procedure). When a dispute divides the parties and the arbitration 
agreement is invoked, the arbitrators designated, and the tribunal constituted, the 
                                                          
 93 See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 390-1.  See also institutional 
rules at Rules of Arbitration, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (May 1, 2010), 
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/other/rules_arb_english.pdf; ICSID 
Convention, Regulations and Rules, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT 
DISPUTES, WORLD BANK, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp; Arbitration 
Rules (2000 Edition), CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS, http://www.ciarb.org/infor 
mation-and-resources/2010/06/14/CIArb%20Arbitration%20Rules.pdf;  Maritime Arbitration 
Rules, SOCIETY OF MARITIME ARBITRATORS, http://www.smany.org/sma/about6-1.html. 
 94 See generally CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3. 
 95 Id. at 77. 
 96 Id. at 77-86. 
 97 Id. at 48-50. 
 98 Id. at 48. 
 99 Id. at 49. 
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right to decide flows from the parties to the arbitrators,100 just as the earlier 
designation of an arbitral administrator exemplified, and concomitantly signaled, the 
abridgement of the parties’ absolute authority.  The constitution of an arbitral 
tribunal invests the arbitrators with the capacity to begin the trial of the matter and 
progress to the resolution of the dispute.101  At this stage, the arbitrators’ authority 
can only be restrained by the arbitrating parties’ right and ability to settle,102 unless 
the arbitral contract contains uncommon stipulations. 
Once the proceedings commence, the parties’ power is further constricted and the 
arbitrators’ authority grows and becomes nearly absolute.  At this point, the 
arbitrators exercise sovereign authority over the arbitration.  The arbitral tribunal 
decides both procedural and substantive matters,103 ranging from the choice and 
implementation of trial mechanisms to the interpretation of the main contract (and, 
perhaps, the arbitral clause),104 ending with the construction and application of the 
law or other governing substantive predicates.105  In this setting, the arbitral 
administrator’s function is ministerial.106  The contract generally invests the 
arbitrators with comprehensive adjudicatory powers.  The arbitration agreement is 
the law of the arbitration, as long as it satisfies the basic conditions of contract 
validity and the State acquiesces to arbitration and the exercise of contract power by 
the parties.107  As noted earlier,108 the State policy on arbitration will be expressed 
through legislation and in accompanying court opinions. 
The State policy on arbitration has an impact upon the exercise of party choice 
and the conduct of arbitrations.  Most contemporary arbitration statutes (like the 
FAA) command that courts facilitate and assist arbitral proceedings.109  Once an 
award is rendered and coercive enforcement becomes necessary, the State emerges 
as the final arbiter in the process.110  At this juncture, disgruntled or aggrieved parties 
can avail themselves of the governing legislation and demand that awards and the 
process that generated them comply with all the elements of the governing legal 
rules.  Aggressive judicial policing of arbitrator determinations and arbitral 
proceedings indicates that State regulations disfavor arbitration and discourage 
recourse to the remedy.  But for a few jurisdictions, courts generally engage in a 
hospitable and narrow evaluation of arbitrations and their determinations.111  
                                                          
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 50. 
 102 Id. at 48-50 n.21. 
 103 Id. at 51-52. 
 104 Id. at 50. 
 105 Id. at 60-61. 
 106 Id. at 51-54. 
 107 See supra text accompanying notes 84-5. 
 108 See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 16-19. 
 109 See FAA, supra note 16, § 10; Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396. 
 110 See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 392-98. 
 111 Id. 
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Moreover, parties are expected to raise objections in a timely manner; the failure to 
act promptly will constitute a waiver of their complaints.  Even evident substantive 
or factual misunderstandings by arbitrators are deemed innocuous and 
inactionable.112  Moreover, arbitrators have substantial discretion in the conduct of 
arbitral proceedings.113  In order to undermine the validity of an award, procedural 
errors must constitute fundamental prejudice to a party’s basic rights.114  The most 
likely actionable flaw is an arbitrator’s failure to disclose a known or ‘knowable’ 
conflict of interest.115  As long as State policy favors arbitration, courts engage in 
circumscribed, subdued, and unassertive assessments of the operation of the arbitral 
process. 
III.  STATIST AND MEDITATIVE ARBITRATION 
Power relationships—who holds decisional authority, how much of it, and 
when—have generated a “new” debate in U.S. arbitration law.  The asserted 
positions highlight the clash between party autonomy and State regulation and revisit 
the legitimacy of arbitration founded upon contract—so-called consensual 
arbitration.  The critical questions center upon the extent, if any, of the State’s 
preemptive role in regulating arbitration and, relatedly, whether freedom of contract 
always reigns supreme in the reference to and operation of arbitral adjudication.116  
The written exchanges have propounded a stark choice between a statist and market-
driven concept of arbitration—an issue that has actually long preoccupied the 
thinking about arbitration.    
The Russian model of arbitration best exemplifies the statist perspective on 
arbitration.117  According to Russian concepts, arbitrators, their adjudicatory powers, 
                                                          
 112 See, e.g., Wallace v. Bultar, 378 F.3d 182 (2d. Cir. 2004); Agrawal v. Agrawal, 775 F. 
Supp. 588 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 969 F.2d 1041 (2d. Cir. 1992). 
 113 See, e.g., Berlacher v. Painewebber Inc., 759 F. Supp. 21 (1991); Robbins v. Day, 954 
F. 2d 679 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 870 (1992); Hayne, Miller & Farni, Inc. v. Flume, 
888 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Wis. 1995). 
 114 See FAA, supra note 16, § 10(a)(3) (“Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in 
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence 
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of 
any party have been prejudiced.”).  
 115 See, e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 
(1968); Crow Constr. Co. v. Jeffrey M. Brown Assoc. Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 217 (E.D. Pa. 
2003); Morelite Constr. Corp. v. NYC Dist. Counc. Carpen. Ben. Fds., 748 F.2d 79 (2d. Cir. 
1984); Ovitz v. Schulman, 133 Cal. App. 4th 830 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 116 See Christopher Drahozal, Privating Ordering and International Commercial 
Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1031 (2009); Christopher Gibson, Arbitration, Civilization 
and Public Policy:  Seeking Counterpoise between Arbitral Autonomy and the Public Policy 
Defense in View of Foreign Mandatory Public Law, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1227 (2009). 
 117 On Russian Federation arbitration, see William Butler, State Interests and Arbitration: 
The Russian Model, 113 PENN ST. L. REV 1189 (2009) (Prof. Butler’s article was part of a 
symposium, entitled, “Building the Civilization of Arbitration,” sponsored by the Penn State 
Law Review.  The articles were subsequently published as a book by Wildy, Simmonds & 
Hill Publishers (London) in 2010.  The volume bears the title of the symposium, BUILDING 
THE CIVILIZATION OF ARBITRATION, edited by myself and Angelica Sinopole, a lawyer at 
Sullivan and Cromwell (NYC), who served as an Editor-in-Chief of the Penn State law review 
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and the very principle of contract freedom are secondary to the State regulation of 
arbitration.118  A number of U.S. academic commentators align themselves with the 
statist view of arbitration.  Their position centers upon the neologistic phrase—
“private ordering” process—to describe arbitration and its operation.119  The phrase, 
in effect, has founded an academic trend that argues that arbitrators cannot, by their 
conduct of proceedings or decisions, thwart or defy a State’s public interest policies 
and practices.120  They must comply with the jurisdictional seat’s mandatory legal 
provisions.  But for its contemporary political substratum, the position barely differs 
from F.A. Mann’s stance in the debate with Berthold Goldman about the existence 
and legitimacy of “anational” arbitration.121  Otherwise stated, the State may have 
ceded a large portion of the ministerial function of civil adjudication to arbitration, 
but private adjudication remains a mechanism within a uniquely political activity at 
the core of the State’s public responsibilities.122  Delegation by the State does not 
imply the surrender of State authority to private interests and parties.   
The private ordering camp endorses the enhanced judicial policing of arbitral 
awards and agreements—their nullification when they allegedly intrude upon the 
preemptory functions or jurisdiction of the State.  While authority in arbitration may 
be “shared,” the advocates posit, the State has ultimate authority―a veto power.   
The parties in arbitration cannot be absolved of their responsibility to obey 
fundamental legal norms, assuming that these norms can be identified and 
established on the basis of solid legal principles.  Because they adjudicate 
controversies, arbitrators are the implicit agents of the State.  The State is not, and 
cannot be, indifferent to the resolution of disputes and the application of law, no 
matter where or how they take place. 
                                                          
during the symposium.)  See also DAVID GOLDBERG, GORDON BLANKE, & JULIA ZAGONEK, 
ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, Russian Federation 
(2006). 
 118 See generally Butler, supra note 117. 
 119 An online dictionary provides two definitions of “neologism”:  1. “a new word, usage, 
or expression,” and 2. “a meaningless word coined by a psychotic.”  Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/neologism.  The notion 
of “private-ordering” straddles the fence between the two definitions.  It testifies to the 
limitations of academic coinage.  It is neither particularly useful nor enlightening.  It seems 
simply to describe a well-established concept with a new term.  The expression has elements 
of originality, but the idea it encapsulates is entirely recycled.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Private Ordering, 97 NW. L. REV. 319, 320-21 (2002); Oliver E. Williamson, The Law of 
Contract:  Private Ordering, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 438 (2002); Michael Birnhack, Principle of 
Private Ordering, HAFIA CENTER OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, www.isoc.org.il/hasdara 
/private_ordering doc (“Private Ordering is the process of setting up of social norms by 
parties involved in the regulated activity . . .  and not by the state.”). 
 120 See sources cited supra note 116. 
 121 On F.A. Mann and Berthold Goldman, see THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ed., LEX 
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION:  A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT (rev. ed. 1998). 
 122 The Court’s opinions permitted arbitration to function with greater autonomy while 
minimizing the role of judicial supervision and reducing the volume of litigation pertaining to 
arbitration.  See First Options of Chicago, 514 U.S. at 943 (“A court must defer to an 
arbitrator's arbitrability decision when the parties submitted that matter to arbitration.”); 
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453. 
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This concept of arbitration stands in contradistinction to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decisional doctrine.  Its proponents fail to heed the Court’s warning about 
the consequences of excessive judicial litigation about arbitration.123  They trust the 
State, despite its changing power structure and inability to resist short-term political 
advantage, to establish legal rules that promote the general good.  This concept of 
arbitration ignores the testimony from the history of arbitration itself—in particular, 
from maritime and CBA arbitration—that extols the virtues of self-regulation.124  
The very development of American arbitration law makes evident that State 
regulation of arbitration need not be expanded beyond deferential judicial 
supervision. 
The market and party-driven view of arbitration is a more robust and convincing 
concept of the distribution of authority within the arbitral process.  It is not based 
upon imported values or convictions, alien to both arbitration and adjudication.  It 
emerged from actual experience with the process.  In this configuration, the parties 
exercise a stronger influence on the arbitration by choosing a trial format in their 
agreement125 and by participating in an assessment of the award before it is finalized 
by the arbitrator.126  While the party choice of an arbitral trial at the head of the 
                                                          
 123 See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3. 
 124 See Lawrence Newman, Agreements to Arbitrate and the Predictability of Procedures, 
113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1323 (2009). 
 125 See Hans Smit, Contractual Modifications of the Arbitral Process, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 
995 (2009). 
 126 See Jeanmarie Papelian, Collaborative Divorce:  Toward a Conflict-Free Divorce, 7 
ABA FAM. LAW LIT. 1, 9 (2008) (Collaborative law consists of a “paradigm shift” under which 
parties engage in cooperative strategies to resolve disputes.  It applies primarily in the family 
law area, situations in which the parties are likely to need an on-going relationship.  The 
approach eliminates the threat of adversarial litigation and encourages parties to focus on 
logical problem-solving and their respective self-interest.  The process is based on four 
principles:  “(1) proactive participation; (2) interest-based understanding; (3) cooperative 
resolution; and (4) team effort.”).  See also John Lande, Principles for Policymaking About 
Collaborative Law and Other ADR Processes, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 619 (2007); 
Michael Moffitt, Symposium:  Against Settlement:  Twenty-Five Years Later:  Three Things to 
be Against (“Settlement” Not Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1226 n. 86 (2009) (“This 
system incentivizes parties and attorneys to work together.  While judges must follow specific 
rules and guidelines, parties using the collaborative process can create customized solutions 
and control the pace of the process.”); Rebecca A. Koford, Conflicted Collaborating:  The 
Ethics of Limited Representation in Collaborative Law, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 827 (2008); 
John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law:  Ethics ad Practice of Lawyer 
Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. 1315 
(2003). 
There is some evidence that a consultative procedure has been practiced in the judicial setting.  
In Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, the court acknowledged 
that it had circulated “draft judgments” “to counsel, solicitors and the parties on a confidential 
basis in accordance with well understood practices.”  Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & 
Commonwealth Affairs, [2010] EWHC (Civ) 158, [¶ 4], Q.B. (Eng.), available at 
www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2010/158.html. These practices allowed “the opportunity 
for correction” even by the judge because none of the terms of a draft judgment were binding.  
Id. 
The court further explained: 
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process probably reflects a judicious use of contract freedom, the submission of a 
draft award to the parties is problematic.  Both changes may be market-savvy, but 
collaboration between the arbitrator and the parties as to the final award muddles the 
role of the arbitrator and redefines the adjudicatory character of arbitration.  The 
final determination is envisaged as a type of collaborative exercise, but the extent of 
collaboration, a vital concern to the legitimacy of the procedure, is unclear.   
There are serious misgivings associated with decisional collaboration.  First, it 
ironically highlights the benefits of the statist heavy-handed regulation of arbitration.  
Statism’s emphasis on the public interest restricts contract freedom and arbitrator 
discretion and lessens the prospect of collaboration and, concomitantly, the danger of 
collusion and self-interested conduct.  Second, when a sharing of decisional 
authority takes place between the arbitrator and the parties, it is difficult to determine 
which actor, if any, is the true adjudicator and whether genuine adjudication has 
taken place.  The process appears to have elements of both arbitration and mediation 
or negotiation.127  Third, it is difficult to justify collaborative arbitration as a form of 
closing arguments.  It represents a collegial decision between the arbitrator and the 
parties.  It creates a possibly ambiguous relationship, especially in terms of the 
arbitrator’s reappointment in subsequent litigation.  Finally, it may be a form of 
arbitration that is useful only in limited circumstances, e.g., involving an arbitration 
with a single arbitrator or parties who are seeking to repair a transaction and 
continue their commercial partnership.  It is always hazardous to blur essential 
boundaries between different processes and merge them eclectically.  Anarchy is not 
creativity if the exercise of license does not generate clarity or lucidity. 
Be that as it may, greater party presence and power in the decisional phases of 
arbitration may announce (I strongly suspect) the future progression of the arbitral 
process.  It repairs the rift of authority between the arbitrator and the parties.  
Nothing in the current law prevents contracting parties from choosing a collaborative 
form of arbitration, in which the designated arbitrator performs the role of an 
“evaluative mediator” who guides the parties to an agreement on what the arbitrator 
(or they) believe(s) to be their best solution.  To some degree, the arbitrator sets the 
table, but the parties, if they agree, can decide where to sit.  The arbitrator is seeking 
party acquiescence or accommodation before the hammer of decision falls.  Such 
“meditative arbitrations” can emphasize settlement and are but a dim reflection of a 
standard adjudication.  Unless the proper personalities and dispositions are in place, 
the incorporation of a consultative stage to the arbitral process is likely to be 
confusing and perhaps ritualistic.  While party agreement should prevail, when it is 
absent, someone must make the final decision.  Collaboration between the arbitrator 
                                                          
The primary purpose of this practice is to enable any typographical or similar errors in 
the judgments to be notified to the court.  The circulation of the draft judgment in this 
way is not intended to provide an opportunity to any party (and in particular the 
unsuccessful party) to reopen or reargue the case, or to repeat submissions made at the 
hearing, or to deploy fresh ones.  However on rare occasions, and in exceptional 
circumstances, the court may properly be invited to reconsider part of the terms of its 
draft.   
Id. [¶ 5]. 
 127 See MEGAN E. TELFORD, MED-ARB:  A VIABLE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ALTERNATIVE 
(2000); Emilia Onyema, The Use of Med-Arb in International Commercial Dispute 
Resolution, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 411 (2011). 
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and the parties could only be effective when the arbitration has fully informed the 
parties, who―guided by the arbitrator’s resolution―can reach the settlement that 
eluded them at the outset.  In the end, it is a procedure that may underestimate the 
depth of human disagreement. 
In order to preserve the adjudicatory integrity of arbitration, consultations 
between the arbitrator and the arbitrating parties could be limited to achieving 
specific objectives that are intended to perfect the award and immunize it to, or 
perhaps remove it from, judicial challenge.  Review by the parties should purge the 
determination of factual imprecisions, flagrantly erroneous reasoning, or 
incomprehensible conclusions.  Consultations at the final stage of the process would 
be, in essence, an extensive editing exercise.  The building of consensus between the 
parties as to the award should be a consequence, not the objective, of the procedure.  
The losing party may find it difficult to confine its evaluation to the written quality 
of the award.  In the present state of the law, any challenges on the merits, 
amounting to an internal appeal to the deciding arbitrator, should only allow the 
arbitrator to respond to party objections in a fashion that does not truly alter the 
initial determination.  Consultations would be a means of rectifying evident errors or 
misunderstandings and to state fundamental opposition to the arbitrator’s 
conclusions.  It is one thing to ask the arbitrator to respond to objections; it is quite 
another matter to have the arbitrator take them into account in revisiting the 
determination.  The other party would, at the very least, participate in the 
proceeding.  It would have the consequence of making the arbitral process more 
judicial and adversarial at the critical stage of decision.  Crossing the line into 
consultations and collaborative endings could be a perilous development that alters 
the adjudicatory gravamen of the arbitral remedy. 
IV.  THE SPECTRE OF MORE AGGRESSIVE JUDICIAL SUPERVISION 
Recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings indicate a possible reversal of the Court’s 
favorable attitude toward arbitration in the form of a more pervasive and persistent 
form of judicial supervision.  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds, Inc.128 and Rent-A-
Center v. Jackson129  were disturbing rulings that portended a substantial 
reorientation of the doctrinal direction on arbitration law.  It seemed that arbitration’s 
status as the Court’s golden child was being reconsidered.  The cases were decided 
by a conservative majority; it was, therefore, entirely plausible that the Court wanted 
to reassert the traditional role of the judiciary in the resolution of civil litigation.   
Stolt-Nielsen was by far the more radical case.130  It involved the maritime 
transportation of goods.131  The cargo owner believed that the transporter had 
engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy with other shippers that affected suppliers of 
the commodity.132  The allegation was made during an arbitration between the 
transporter and the cargo owner.133  The possibility of conducting class action 
                                                          
 128 Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. 1758. 
 129 Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. 2772. 
 130 Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. 1758. 
 131 See id. at 1764-65. 
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proceedings was raised and specifically submitted in a written submission to the 
sitting arbitrators.134  The arbitral clause made no mention of the availability of class 
proceedings.135  The arbitrators accepted the submission, held hearings, and listened 
to experts.136  They rendered an award stating the parties’ original agreement did not 
prohibit class proceedings.137   
The Court vehemently disagreed with the arbitrators’ conclusion, permitting the 
parties, in effect, to engage in class proceedings under the rubric of their arbitral 
clause.138  It founded its objection on two factors: (1) the silence of the agreement; 
and (2) the enormous procedural difference between bilateral arbitration and class 
litigation.139  The majority stated and reiterated that the silence of the arbitral clause 
was deafening.140  The arbitrators could not simply invent content and ascribe it to 
the contract.141  Silence was silence; it did not point in any direction.142  Arbitrators 
could not rewrite the parties’ contract.143  The parties had not agreed to class 
proceedings.144  The Court emphasized that at least one maritime expert maintained 
that class litigation was wholly incongruous in maritime transactions, if only because 
its transborder character would generate paralyzing conflicts of law and, perhaps, 
jurisdiction.145   
The majority then contended that its reversal of the arbitrators’ determination 
was further justified by the enormous procedural differences between ordinary 
arbitration and class litigation.146  Class litigation is antagonistic to arbitration and its 
adjudication goals.147  It conflicts with and undermines arbitration’s informality, 
confidentiality, expedition, and use of expertise.  Interpreting the arbitral clause, in 
effect, to tolerate class procedures adds a material element to the parties’ agreement 
that completely alters it, creating a contract not agreed-to by the contracting 
parties.148  In effect, the majority opinion misrepresented the narrow character of 
arbitrators’ award and engaged in the judicial second-guessing of expert arbitrators 
in a highly commercial and traditional form of arbitration. 
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The Court’s ruling in Stolt-Nielsen was its first direct statement about class 
litigation in arbitration.  It was an advance over the plurality decision in Bazzle,149 in 
which the Court essentially ignored the class litigation issue.  There, to address the 
question of the silence of the arbitral contract, it attributed greater interpretative 
authority to the arbitrator to construe the arbitral clause.150  In Bazzle, the Court 
greatly enhanced the arbitrator’s decisional authority at the head of the process, 
allowing the arbitrator, in effect, to resolve the issues of contract inarbitrability 
without a party-conferred delegation of jurisdictional authority.151  When the 
majority concluded that the Stolt-Nielsen arbitrators engaged in an “excess of 
authority,” it contradicted the core plurality ruling in Bazzle and violated the prime 
admonition of contemporary arbitration law by engaging in a merits review of the 
award.  In effect, the Court aggrandized judicial supervision, voided the holding in 
Bazzle, and displayed an unsympathetic attitude toward arbitration and its systemic 
needs.  Stolt-Nielsen, along with Volt Information Sciences, Inc.,152 are the only two 
modern arbitration cases in which other policies trumped the usually hospitable 
judicial support for arbitration.  In Volt, it seems to have been motivated by the need 
to dispense lessons in contract drafting and, in Stolt-Nielsen, the Court’s unfavorable 
assessment of class action and its impact upon economic and commercial activity. 
Rent-A-Center v. Jackson (RAC) follows Stolt-Nielsen.153  Although the majority 
reasoning there is much less dismissive of arbitration and its interests, the Court 
again endorses a policy of greater judicial supervision of the arbitral process.154  The 
circumstances are a variation on the fraud-in-the-inducement problem in Prima 
Paint.155  In RAC, the issue pertained specifically to a delegation of jurisdictional 
authority under the contract pursuant to First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan.156  
Jackson alleged that the arbitral clause unilaterally imposed by the employer was 
unconscionable because, inter alia, of the fee-splitting arrangement and the 
limitations on discovery.157  These deficiencies, it was asserted, voided the entire 
clause because abuse and unfairness permeated the agreement.158 
As in Prima Paint, the plaintiff failed to direct its objection to the jurisdictional 
delegation in particular.159  The delegation, therefore, remained in effect and gave the 
arbitrator the power to decide the unconscionability claims raised by the 
employee.160  The immediate application of the reasoning in RAC clearly supported 
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arbitration and arbitrability, but—once it was decided—all future plaintiffs would 
avoid the error of Jackson’s strategy and challenge directly the validity of the 
jurisdictional delegation.  Under the holding in RAC, the court would then need to 
intervene and rule on the contractual propriety of the delegation provision.  There 
was no indication that review would be the hospitable supervision that ordinarily 
applies to enforcement matters in arbitration.  A possibly strong judicial presence at 
the head of the arbitral process was virtually guaranteed, attributing greater power to 
the courts over arbitration.  Such a precedent hardly adds to the autonomy, 
independence, and functionality of arbitration. 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, a subsequent case, reaffirmed the Court’s 
traditional and long-standing support of arbitration.161  It held that a line of California 
state court rulings that often led to holding arbitration clauses with class action 
waivers unconscionable conflicted with the fundamental objectives of FAA § 2 and 
was preempted by federal law.162  The decision essentially validated class waivers as 
a lawful part of the bargain for arbitration.  It also gave implied legitimacy to 
adhesive consumer contracts.  In so ruling, the Court repeated the Stolt-Nielsen 
distinction between bilateral arbitration and class proceedings, confirming the 
Court’s distaste for aggregation litigation.  Nonetheless, the prospect of de novo 
review of arbitral awards and the availability of judicial supervision even when the 
parties have entered into a jurisdictional delegation provision challenge more 
substantially than ever the independent and unobstructed operation of the arbitral 
process. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
Although the course of the American judicial doctrine on arbitration may have 
been unsettled by recent decisions,163 judicial rulings are likely to remain favorable 
to arbitration.  The fragility of settled principles, however, could be lessened by the 
incorporation of greater analytical rigor in the Court’s reasoning.  The Court’s 
decisional law is built on common law modalities.  It now seems to contain two 
separability doctrines and provide for contractual and decisional versions of 
kompetenz-kompetenz.  The haphazard quality of the analysis has reinforced the 
criticism of arbitration in adhesive circumstances.  The Court should explain why an 
imposed legal obligation to arbitrate is nonetheless legally valid, much like it 
explained—over time and a number of cases—why federal law preempts state laws 
that conflict with its interpretation of the FAA.  Cogent analysis always pays 
substantial long-term dividends. 
Obviously, the Court marches to the beat of its own drum.  Its responsibilities are 
substantial.  Its rulings have a mighty impact upon society.  Nonetheless, 
opportunistic reasoning makes arbitration vulnerable to legislative attacks and the 
assaults of advocacy.  Circumstantial doctrinal inventions lack coherence and can 
become inconsistent; cryptic, implausible explanations create derision and 
confusion.  In a word, despite its many accomplishments, the judicial doctrine on 
                                                          
 161 AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
 162 Id. at 1749-50. 
 163 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1758; Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. ___, 130 
S. Ct. 2772. 
2011] FREEDOM AND GOVERNANCE 91 
 
arbitration is wanting in substantive rigor, weakening the force of the vision that 
animates it. 
Throughout the decisional law on arbitration, the strained and makeshift 
character of majority opinions is almost always accompanied by high quality 
dissenting opinions.  This feature of the law may indicate the difficulty of achieving 
a majority consensus within the Court and, concomitantly, the imperative need to 
forge a consensus on arbitration because of its importance to civil litigation.  As 
Justice Ginsberg has pointed out, arriving at a five-member majority can have a 
decisive impact upon the content of an opinion, making it into a more eclectic and 
scattered statement of law.  Articulating an individual position in opposition is easier 
to express in a cohesive declaration.  The difference between Justice Souter’s 
majority opinion in Hall Street Associates and dissent in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett is a 
telling illustration.164 
The irony that results from the interplay of historical factors and institutional 
exigencies is that one of the most hospitable jurisdictions to arbitration does not have 
a cogent statement of law on arbitration.  The FAA is antiquated and was molded as 
special interest legislation.  It is not a law of arbitration in any real sense of that term, 
and political partisanship makes a new, more elaborate version virtually impossible.  
The RUAA, literally, is a disaster.  The Reporter’s Notes are, by far, a better 
statutory statement than the provisions themselves.  The uniform law is poorly 
written and organized.  Moreover, it has now been superseded by subsequent 
developments.   
Finally, the development of collaborative arbitration coalesces with the desultory 
analytical quality of arbitration opinions to create a true danger to the continued 
viability of the mechanism.  While arbitrations must remain independent of the 
courts, arbitrators do not necessarily need to be autonomous in relation to the 
arbitrating parties.  The clandestine power struggle between these principal actors 
arises in part because parties pay the arbitrators and the latter exercise authority 
pursuant to a contract, not a public jurisdictional mandate.  Arbitral practice may no 
longer be able to justify the court-like subordination of the parties to the arbitrator.  
Arbitration may be transformed into a form of “participatory adjudication” in which 
results are reached only after extensive consultations between the arbitrating parties 
and the arbitrator.  The institution of such a system would be a radical departure 
from settled practices and currently controlling views.  It may so alter arbitration that 
the latter becomes ineffective in the resolution of disputes.  Despite the lucidity of 
the Court’s vision on arbitration, there is an equally clear need for limpid definition 
of essential notions.  The Court should provide the necessary guidance to protect the 
integrity of arbitral adjudication and prevent it from becoming a tool by which 
arbitrators placate parties and sustain their own business interests. 
Public judicial adjudication is characterized by two attributes.  First, the 
application of public jurisdiction complicates the dispute resolution process with 
unyielding rights protections and procedural requirements.  Solutions are bloated and 
reached inefficiently; proceedings are protracted and prone to both legitimate and 
illegitimate delay; the process devours time and money.  Received political values 
dominate the mechanism, which is more formal, complex, and difficult to 
implement.  The procedural ritual often far exceeds, and even distorts, the parties’ 
disputes.  Second, unless there is outright corruption, judges—certainly federal 
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judges who are appointed for life—come as close as possible to a state of absolute 
disinterestedness.  They have no personal stake in the outcome of the proceeding; if 
they do, they are obligated to recuse themselves.  They are the impersonal agents of 
the State, would-be public servants, whose oath requires fidelity to the U.S. 
Constitution and the integrity of law.  Other than the subliminal influence of 
personal opinions, judges must behave in a neutral manner:  They apply legal 
precedents, guarantee that due process governs, and survey the parties’ combat for 
procedural rectitude.  The impartial character of the process is further guaranteed by 
the availability of appeal to yet other judges. 
When an arbitrator begins collaborating with the arbitrating parties to reach a 
final resolution, the adjudicatory character and integrity of the arbitral process are 
diminished.  Commercial parties, at least those who disfavor arbitration, have long 
complained about the “dictatorship of the arbitrator.”  In fact, some commercial 
parties have further maintained that they should return to the process of judicial 
litigation because it better enables them to negotiate and exercise control over their 
own destiny.  Enhancing party prerogatives to all stages of the arbitration may make 
the process less subject to criticism by its users, but—to some degree—collaboration 
transforms arbitral adjudication into structured negotiations or a form of 
arb/med/arb, in which the arbitrator finalizes the dispute (adjudication) only after the 
parties have reviewed and approved the arbitrator’s conclusions (settlement).  The 
award constitutes a form of homologation or a ruling based upon agreed terms. 
This adjustment of arbitration is initially controversial, but it may ultimately be 
inconsequential.  It gives greater, more forceful expression to the principle of party 
autonomy.  It may be essential to the continued viability of commercial arbitration.  
It reflects the type of osmosis that, historically, prevailed in the creation and 
development of traditional forms of arbitration.  It alters fundamentally, however, 
the protocol of arbitration, transforms the raison d’être of the process by giving it a 
hybrid character, and creates a form of complicity that would be intolerable in the 
public process of adjudication.  Although it may be a brief for democratic 
governance or the rule of the marketplace, it foils the aloofness of the arbitrator and 
the neutrality of the process.  Survival through adaptability may be arbitration’s most 
vital attribute, but it is beginning to exact a substantial price.  Are the proponents of 
the various transformations and modifications being entrapped by their own ideas?  
Are we losing sight of the overriding public policy exigency of adjudication by 
focusing so ardently upon the need for the arbitral remedy’s pragmatic adaptability?  
These concerns restate the original dilemma of establishing a proper boundary 
between autonomous self-regulation and the essential interests of society in 
maintaining both its jurisdictional authority over adjudication and its level of 
civilization. 
Government regulation may be distasteful and destructive, but it is well-known 
and its consequences predictable.  It is rarely a feliticious event and even less 
frequently produces real benefits for society or the sectors it afflicts.  In comparison, 
ingenious commercial creativity, although based upon an intimate sense of the 
specialty area, is more disturbing than the prospect of bureaucratic regulation.  It 
gives rise to sui generis insights that portend real change, the results of which will 
only be known once they have been tested by time and the marketplace.  Some 
moments of inspiration can be of enormous value, while others are merely flares that 
never reach the level of useful or significant change.  The propriety of the 
contemplated change and the future of arbitration remain murky and elusive.  A bad 
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choice as to what is acceptable practice could result in substantial damage to the 
arbitral process as well as the protection of rights.   
